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Of Driver’s Licenses and Debtor’s Prison
John B. Mitchell1 and Kelly Kunsch2
INTRODUCTION
There were jokes popular in the 1950s called “moron” jokes. They did
not target any race, nationality, or profession (like lawyers)—they just
targeted morons. Question: “Why did the moron jump off the Empire State
Building?” Answer: “He wanted to make a hit on Broadway.” Typical
moron joke—stupid. But there was one that seemed to capture a bit of
insight into the human character. Question: “Why did the moron keep
hitting his head against the wall?” Answer: “Because it felt so good when
he stopped.”
Apparently those who legislate and enforce the laws in lower courts,
dealing with traffic misdemeanors, have never heard the joke: they keep
hitting their heads against the proverbial wall, but they do not stop.
Unfortunately, metaphorically, this wall is made up of low-income people
whose driver’s licenses are revoked because they cannot afford to pay
traffic fines. Consequently, this results in the criminalization of lowincome people for driving without being able to pay one of the associated
costs of driving (i.e., traffic fines), and the conversion of the driver’s
license into a form of collateral for that debt.3
In our society, the driver’s license is a precious commodity, and if the
government threatens to take our’s away, it is certain to capture our
attention. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that courts and legislatures
throughout the country have chosen to use the threat of imposing an
administrative suspension of an individual’s driver’s license as a means of
coercing the individual to pay any unpaid fines for traffic tickets. While
this approach to debt collections might have made sense at its inception,
currently, this approach is impractical; the entire enterprise of using driver’s
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license suspensions to collect fines from low-income individuals is
seriously misguided. The story that follows is not an uncommon scenario;
it illustrates what we refer to throughout this article as “the cycle.”

A NOT SO UNUSUAL STORY
In a court whose jurisdiction included misdemeanor traffic offenses,
Sally Jones (Sally) is found guilty of her third conviction for driving with a
revoked driver’s license,4 and is sent to jail for several months.5 Sally’s
conviction appears appropriate, one might think; she obviously does not get
the point, and it is time for some “specific deterrence”6 in the form of
serious jail time to drive the point home to her. Often, however, when one
looks more closely, the story may be very different than the simple tale of
crime and punishment imagined.
Sally7 once had a driver’s license, which was subsequently revoked. But
here the story deviates from expectations. Sally is a single mother who
lives with her sister, who is also a single mother. Her sister works during
the day and Sally watches the children. Sally works at night and her sister
watches the children. They live outside the city, because housing in the city
is unaffordable. Sally drives to work because the available public
transportation is neither sufficiently direct nor frequent enough (since she
works the night shift) to offer even a remotely rational transportation
option.
Sally’s driver’s license was not originally revoked for driving while
intoxicated, vehicular homicide, reckless driving, excessive moving
violations, or any other offense related to the safe handling of a motor
vehicle. Rather, she did not pay a fine8 imposed for running a stop sign and
for driving a vehicle with expired tabs. Sally received the ticket, but threw
it in her glove compartment and forgot about it;9 she did not look carefully
at the ticket and thought that she would hear from the court. Meanwhile,
Sally’s ticket debt was compounding. Immediately after the infraction was
issued, “statutory fees” were added (in Washington, 120 percent of the cost
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of the assessed fine for the infraction).10 When Sally did not respond, a
default fee was added.11 Shortly thereafter, Sally’s case was referred to a
collection agency, which then added another 30 percent collection fee on
the top12 and 12 percent interest on the total unpaid debt.
Meanwhile, the Department of Licensing (DOL) learned of the large
unpaid fines and administratively suspended Sally’s driver’s license.13
Sally, however, did not receive notice of the suspension.14 She had moved
several times and at some point forgot to notify the DOL of her new
address. Even if Sally had notified the DOL of her change of address, it
would not be all that uncommon for the DOL database to fail to accurately
note the changes and thereby send the notice to a wrong or non-existent
address.15
Then one evening on the way home from work, Sally was pulled over
because her left taillight was out. After a computer check by the police
officer revealed a suspension on Sally’s driver’s license, she was arrested
and charged with a misdemeanor, driving with a suspended driver’s license
in the third degree (hereinafter DWLS3).16
When Sally went to court for her first appearance, there were no public
defenders present.17 Sally talked to the prosecutor, waived her right to
counsel, and made some deal, pleading guilty to DWLS3. Consequently,
another set of large fines now were added to what she owed.18 If Sally
could have written a check for what was then well over a thousand dollars
in fines, she would have her driver’s license back. But Sally did not have a
check or even a checking account. More importantly, she did not have the
money to spend on something that would not bring in real goods or
services, and would deplete her entire share of more than a month of food,
shelter and clothing19 for her and her family.20 So, Sally decided that she
would not have a driver’s license.21 Neither she nor her sister wanted to
raise their children on welfare. She could not pay the fine,22 but wanted to
work. Realistically, that meant driving.
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Although Sally was well aware that she was driving with a revoked
driver’s license, she kept driving; she needed to get back and forth to her
minimum wage employment and to take her children and her sister’s
children to doctors and daycare. Sally’s chances of getting stopped by law
enforcement were statistically higher than most of us, since she was driving
a “junker” car, replete with a variety of mechanical violations, including a
cracked windshield and a broken taillight. Each time Sally was stopped by
a police officer and issued a ticket, the result was another set of huge fines
and assessed court costs. Currently, Sally owed thousands of dollars to the
court. Unfortunately, Sally’s low paying job was not sufficient to pay the
full amount of the fines. And again, living in an area lacking effective mass
transportation to her work,23 how will she get to work? Obviously the cycle
continued, eventually ending in significant jail time for Sally. After serving
the sentence, she still did not have a driver’s license, had incurred even
more fines, and had lost her job and, subsequently, the basic apartment
where she and her sister were living.

THE PREDICAMENT
While perhaps more sympathetic than some, Sally’s story is little
different than many others. For a defendant who is impoverished, her
failure to pay what could be thousands of dollars of fines is often the result
of rational economic prioritizing. In the State of Washington, someone like
Sally may be able to avoid this cycle by entering into a variety of
relicensing programs headed by prosecutors, the courts, or independent
community agencies.24 Even so, the questions remain: Why must she go
through this very difficult and time consuming hurdle to regain her driver’s
license? Why was her driver’s license revoked in the first place for not
paying a fine?
Of course, our society does not want people driving without valid
driver’s licenses. However, when the cycle begins, not because the
defendant has proved to be an unsafe driver but with a driver’s license
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revocation because she cannot pay her fines, then we are really using the
criminal law to punish poverty. The simple truth is that if many of us found
ourselves facing the initial predicament of our defendant, Sally, we would
take out our checkbook, put off buying that forty-two inch plasma
television for a few months, write the check, and the problem would melt
away. Thus, when you watch the story of someone like Sally, you cannot
help but conjure up images of debtor’s prisons from Dickens,25 or Patrick
O’Brien’s tales of Captain Aubrey of the British Navy during the
Napoleonic Wars.26
If fifty or even one hundred people lost their driver’s licenses because of
their inability to pay, the practice would raise serious justice issues. In fact,
we are talking about far greater numbers. For example, in the State of
Washington, 186,500 driver’s licenses are suspended each year.27 Most of
these suspensions are for nonpayment of fines, and frequently fall upon
low-income minorities.28 DWLS3 cases are estimated to constitute at least
one-third of the calendars of the courts of limited jurisdiction in the State of
Washington.29 This is a very serious issue.

THE WAY WE SEE IT
In this article, we use the operation of the courts in the State of
Washington (Washington) charged with adjudicating misdemeanors, the
courts of limited jurisdiction,30 as an example for our analysis. Our reason
for choosing Washington is simple: we live here and thus have access to
court personnel and records, as well as prosecutors, public defenders,
agency personnel, and such. In doing so, we have found nothing in our
research to give us reason to believe that Washington courts are atypical
among the large number of states that revoke driver’s licenses for
nonpayment of fines. If anything, our research indicates that Washington
courts are at the forefront in developing programs which help people get
back their driver’s licenses once revoked for non-payment of fines.
However, in spite of relicensing programs and the recent alterations to
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existing law (Redmond v. Moore31 and RCW 46.63.11032), Washington has
not effectively rectified the criminalization of low-income people who have
had their driver’s licenses revoked. We conclude that it is unacceptable for
society to punish a person for his/her poverty, and, therefore, revocation a
driver’s license for nonpayment of fines should never be an option for any
state.
In Section A, we will take an historical view of the use of prison to
coerce payment of debt in civil and criminal cases, and the predictable
failure of that system when used against indigents. In Section B, we look at
data from the courts of limited jurisdiction in Washington and in the State
of Florida as an example of the extent to which state governments utilize
driving-related fines for revenue. In Section C, we will explore the
rationales for licensing drivers, the lore and place of the automobile in
American life, the use of fines as punishment for driving without a valid
driver’s license, and the predictably failed results of revoking driver’s
licenses to collect fines. In Section D, we will discuss various proposed
solutions to the conundrum of fining the impoverished, explaining why
none of these solutions are meaningful when dealing with a revoked
license, and conclude with an explanation of why revocation of a driver’s
license should never be used as a way to collect monies due from fines and
tickets.
A. Use of Imprisonment to Collect Civil Debt and Criminal Fines
We do not contend that the jails are currently overflowing with inmates
whose licenses were revoked because they were too poor to pay traffic
fines. Nevertheless, we believe that an extensive discussion of so-called
“debtor’s prison” is warranted for a number of reasons. First, there are
people who serve months in jail for repeatedly driving after their license has
been revoked for failure to pay traffic fines. Further, a review of the history
of debtor’s prison shows that the philosophy underlying the use of
revocation of driver’s licenses as a means of coercing payments is not the
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sudden inspiration of some county auditor, but is deeply embedded in
Western history. Finally, and most importantly, that history demonstrates
the futility of using the coercive penalogical power of the state to collect
debts and accumulate revenue.
1. The Long and Distinguished History of Debtor’s Prison
Civil Debt
The use of imprisonment to collect debts by both the state and private
individuals has a long pedigree, dating back 3,000 years.33 In early Rome,
debtors were given thirty days to pay their debts.34 If a debtor failed to pay
his debt, the creditor could place him under house arrest for another thirty
days in hopes of shaking loose a few coins from the debtor, his family, or
his friends. If funds did not materialize by the end of the second thirty-day
period, the creditor could sell the debtor into slavery35 to recoup his
money.36 Analogously, in some American colonies, indigent debtors could
be sold into indentured servitude.37
By the reign of Justinian, in the sixth century, public debtor’s prisons
replaced the earlier system of private capture, but the other aspects of
private debt collection took a similar form.38 Then, with the rise of
feudalism, arrest for debt all but disappeared.39 Feudal lords simply could
not have their vassals, who were fodder in the Lord’s army, unavailable for
military service because they were languishing in some debtor’s prison.
However, as feudalism waned, imprisonment for debt returned with a fury,
fueled by the Church, which characterized debt and insolvency as a sin.40
In the thirteenth century in England, a series of Acts of Parliament41
solidified a system employing incarceration for debt collections which
continued well into the twentieth century.
Under this system, arrest of the alleged debtor was accomplished via a
series of writs. For example, the Writ of Capias ad Respondendum
(alternatively, termed the process of a “Mesne”), obtained at the inception
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of a suit,42 allowed arrest to prevent the debtor from fraudulently hiding
assets or fleeing. The arrested debtor could obtain freedom by turning over
the disputed property he was alleged to be concealing43 and/or posting bail
to assure he would not flee.44 The Writ of Capias ad Satisfaciendum,45 on
the other hand, was meant to insure collection of the debt once the court
determined the debt was valid. Thus, the debtor sat in prison until he,
family, or friends came forth to pay.46 It was not unheard of for lowincome debtors to die in prison47 when family and friends could not help.
Debtor’s prison, and the accompanying legal writs of Capias ad
Respondendum (Mesne) and Capias ad Satisfaciendum, came to America
with the colonists.48 Long after the ratification of our Constitution, there
existed a federal debtor’s prison.49 In contrast to the separate English
debtor’s prisons, debtors in the United States were generally thrown into the
same jails with criminals.50 In fact, in 1830s Massachusetts, New York,
Pennsylvania, and Maryland, “three to five times as many persons were
imprisoned for debt as for crime.”51
Lest you think all this was part of a long ago, more primitive time, the
threat of jail as a means of encouraging payment for private debt in
America coexisted with remote-controlled color TV’s. While by the 1920s
every state abolished imprisonment for debt52 by Constitution or statute,53
well into the 1960s there existed a great variety of approaches for the use of
Mesne in tort and fraud cases.54 Thus, pleadings could be crafted to plead a
contract claim (for which Mesne was not permitted) as fraud in the
inducement (for which Mesne could be employed under law).55 By such
framing of the pleadings, creditor’s counsel thus would raise the spectre of
bodily arrest, thereby coercing the alleged debtor to settle56 rather than face
arrest and jail.57
Criminal Fines
In 1910, 58 percent of prisoners incarcerated in jail58 were there because,
when sentenced to a choice of fine or of jail time—a sentencing process
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commonly characterized as “thirty dollars or thirty days”59—they could not
pay the former. By 1956, the percentage had risen to 67.5 percent.60 This
use of jail as a means to extract a public fine from the defendant, her family,
or friends was hardly anything new; like its civil counterpart, incarceration
for non-payment of fines had a very ancient lineage.
In feudal England, prior to the time when a fully evolved notion of a
public criminal law existed and was distinguished from civil law, one who
had committed what we would now term a crime (e.g., an assault) could
avoid blood feud (i.e., private revenge) by paying compensation to the
injured party or family,61 a procedure analogous to some remedies for
wrongs found in biblical Mosaic law.62 During the Anglo-Saxon rule of
England, the public notion of crime began to evolve.63 Initially, an assault
in the presence of the feudal lord would require compensation not only to
the victim, but also to the lord for the public offence. The violator was
required to compensate the lord for any crime done on his domain, whether
in his presence or not.64
Following the Norman Conquest in 1066, William the Conqueror65
recognized the economic potential of a public criminal law linked to raising
revenue.66 Under his reign, those found guilty “in the King’s mercy”67 of
any of a number of public crimes forfeited their liberty, but they could
negotiate their freedom through payment of monies, or property, or both, to
the King. This final settlement leading to the criminal’s release was termed
the Finalis Concordia,68 hence, the term “fine.” Thus, the initial use of
imprisonment was not to punish, but to raise revenue.69 It was not until
1383 that the phrase to “pay fine,” which was a punishment, first appeared
in a statute instead of the phrase to “make fine,” which were negotiations.70
Fast forward approximately six hundred years to American soil. The
notion of fine still connoted punishment, but analogous to the time of
William the Conqueror, jail was also used as a means of coercing its
payment.71 Again, in 1956 approximately 67.5 percent of the inmates in
jail72 were there because they could not pay their fines.73
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Under such a regime, a constitutional assault on the imprisonment of
indigents for non-payment of debt was inevitable.74 First, the Supreme
Court found that equal protection was violated when an indigent defendant,
who had served the statutory maximum jail term, was nevertheless kept in
jail to “work off” his fine.75 Next, sending an indigent to jail to “work off”
a fine for an offense punishable by fine only was held, by the Supreme
Court, to run afoul to equal protection.76 Answering the criticism that
indigents could never be punished for fine-only offenses,77 the Court
specifically noted a variety of strategies for imposing the punitive sting of a
fine on an indigent defendant (e.g., deferred or installment payments;
community service in lieu of fine).78 Subsequently, due process was
conjoined with equal protection79 to reverse a probation revocation when
the order of revocation was based upon the probationer’s failure to pay a
fine which was a condition of probation.80 The Supreme Court found that
the lower trial court had erred when the judge failed to hold a hearing first
to determine the defendant’s willingness and ability to pay. For example, if
the probationer did not pay because he simply had insufficient financial
means and was acting in good faith, revocation was constitutionally
prohibited.81
Interestingly, the Supreme Court never dealt with the most common
scenario under which most indigent defendant’s sit in jail (the situation we
have referred to as “thirty dollars or thirty days”).82 The authors recognize
that, analytically, the thirty days is an alternative punishment to the thirty
dollars,83 and believe that fines can be effective punishments.84 If the
choice was “thirty days or fifteen thousand dollars,” one might look at the
constitutional dimensions of this issue differently. But spending a dollar in
1970, or five dollars and fourteen cents today,85 cannot begin to compare to
the deprivation, unpleasantness, fear, and danger from a day spent in a
cage.86 Given the alternative, the choice that any of us would make in this
circumstance is clear: Where’s my ATM card?
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Interestingly, without any explicit Supreme Court pronouncement, the
thirty dollars or thirty days sentencing format disappeared from our
criminal jurisprudence.
It did not really expire under any noble
constitutional banner (though courts may have seen the equal protection
writing on the wall), but fell under the pennant of practical wisdom—this
system simply served nobody’s needs.87 For, as in all the epochs in history
when the impoverished have been jailed for their impoverishment, the
practice has been counterproductive for both private and public actors.
The Failures of Imprisoning Low-income Individuals to Coerce
Payment of Debts or Fines
The title of this subsection would understandably create reactions ranging
from subtle observations concerning the inability to obtain “blood from a
turnip” to more in-your-face criticisms like, “are you stupid; they don’t
have any money—that is why we call them indigents.” Strangely, this
fairly obvious point has not always been apparent in the halls of history.
While there were periods in history when the indebted, his family, or his
friends had to support the costs of the debtor’s confinement to avoid his
death,88 it was much more common for the creditor to pay the costs of
maintaining the debtor in prison.89 Of course, the creditor’s hope was to
call the debtor’s bluff, making him come forth with every asset he or his
family could muster.90 And, if we were talking about the gambling debts of
the profligate son of a wealthy squire or merchant in some eighteenth
century English village, such tactics may have well been successful.
However, if the debtor was low-income, and his friends and family are
poor, imprisoning the debtor was not likely to prove an effective debt
collection strategy.
In the first place, the creditor had to financially maintain the debtor’s
prison stay. If the creditor stopped maintaining the debtor’s prison stay, the
common law generally required the debtor’s release.91 While the debtor
was in jail, he was unable to work to earn any money, and any employment
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he did have was likely lost.92 After some period of time, depending on the
type and amount of the debt (between one and nine months in jail), the
debtor could take the poor “oath” establishing his indigence and be
released.93 Essentially, the creditor threw good money in after bad to feed
and shelter the debtor in jail, and the debtor walked out of jail without
paying a penny.
In the context of incarcerating debtors to induce payment of a fine, the
historical results were just as counterproductive. Society paid the expense
of incarceration, and the cost was not insubstantial.94 On the other hand,
the debtor could not earn money while in jail, he lost whatever job he had,
was removed from family and other social support networks, and could
have, as result of his short term confinement, transitioned from being a
casual criminal to a confirmed offender.95
In fact, only the Romans, who sold debtors into slavery, and the
American colonists, who sold debtors as indentured servants, had a system
for obtaining monies owed from those who possessed none. The Thirteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution offered a serious impediment
to this strategy.96 In spite of this, we still have not learned our lesson. As
detailed in section C, subsection 4, infra., by using revocation of driver’s
licenses and the threat of jail to collect traffic fines, the lower trial courts
are engaging in an endeavor as futile and contra-productive as its historical
predecessors.
B. Revenue Gathering in The Courts of Limited Jurisdiction—Washington
Returns to the Reign of William the Conqueror
Part of the problem in changing the system may be that traffic fines can
be a lucrative source of government revenue,97 but exactly how lucrative
they are is impossible to determine. In the State of Washington, traffic
fines are distributed according to statute and the base penalties for each
infraction are established by court rule.98 For example, as of August 2005,
the base penalty for general parking violations was twenty-four dollars,99
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the base penalty for failure to respond to notice of infraction or failure to
pay penalty was twenty-five dollars, and the base penalty for no valid
driver’s license was $250.
Distribution of fine revenues in Washington is somewhat
convoluted. After certain deductions, the base penalty revenue is divided
between the state and the local jurisdiction (32 percent going to the state; 68
percent to the local jurisdiction).100 Monies allocated to local jurisdictions
are deposited into the jurisdiction’s general fund, not the court system or
law enforcement fund. The state’s portion of revenues is deposited into its
Public Safety and Education Account (PSEA). In addition to revenues from
infraction-based penalties, various statutes allow for special assessments to
be deposited into the PSEA as well. Some of these assessments are
distributed, in part, to local jurisdictions.101
Calculating the total
government revenue from traffic fines is virtually impossible because it
requires reporting from all local jurisdictions (i.e., cities and counties) in the
state.
Even so, in fiscal year 2004, the state government of Washington
collected more that $76 million in traffic fines and forfeitures. While
Washington was not able to provide a specific value for suspended licenses,
the State of Florida reported $47,144,472 in revenues from individuals
paying to reinstate their driver’s licenses from a revocation or suspension in
2004.102 Although a state’s fine revenue often does not even equal 1
percent of its total revenue, it is hardly an insignificant number.
Furthermore, fine revenue is often more significant at the local
municipality level—particularly for more rural locations. For example, the
City of Seattle’s general revenue for “Fines & Forfeits” in 2004 was over
$18 million,103 which was only a small percentage of its total general
revenue of more than $730 million. This is primarily because the City of
Seattle has an enormous base for property, business, and sales taxes.
Contrast the City of Seattle’s percentage with that of Grant County.
Although it covers 2,680 square miles, Grant County has only twenty-eight
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and a half people per square mile.104 Over 47 percent of the county is
unincorporated and the City of Moses Lake, the county’s largest city, has a
population of 16,110. Grant County does, however, have Interstate 90
running right through it. In its most recent published statement of revenue,
Grant County listed “Fines & Forfeits” at $1,759,968. This represented 8.5
percent of its $20,483,301 total general revenue.105
Finally, it is worth noting that fine revenue in Washington in 2004 and
2005 was lower than in prior years because of the State Supreme Court’s
decision in Redmond v. Moore.106 Again, that case found that the
Department of Licensing could not validly suspend a driver’s license unless
it first provided an opportunity for an administrative hearing. The fallout
from that decision was the invalidation of many suspended driving
convictions and the penalties assessed for them. With the new statute in
place,107 licenses will once again be subject to revocation for non-payment
of fines. Accordingly, accompanying revenues should increase from those
in 2004 and 2005.
C. The Driver’s License
1. A Practical Tool for a Practical Society
In order to appreciate the problems associated with using driver’s
licenses for debt collection, it is appropriate to first delve into the various
policy rationales underlying the license requirement. Not surprisingly, none
of these rationales have any relationship to the use of the license as
collateral for debt.
There are few events in the life of an American teenager as significant
and impacting as obtaining a driver’s license.108 A true cultural rite of
passage, the driver’s license irrevocably represents crossing a line on the
path towards independence and adulthood. You can drive; granted, you
may have to constantly negotiate to borrow a family vehicle, obtain a parttime job to pay for insurance and gas, follow parental-imposed rules about
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the number of passengers you can have, etc.
But you can drive.
109
Freedom.
Society, however, has a different set of interests in licensing drivers,110
rather than supporting an emerging sense of maturity and independence in
its teenagers and freeing parents from endless trips to soccer fields and
music lessons. Obviously, driving an automobile is a complex task
requiring a broad range of knowledge, skill, discipline, personal
responsibility, and physical capacity. If done poorly, even for a brief
moment, driving can also be extremely dangerous and destructive. These
huge, heavy machines, hurtling through town and country, at remarkable
speeds resulted in 42,643 deaths,111 2,697,000 injuries,112 and $230.6 billion
in total economic costs from crashes in 2003.113
Therefore, it makes sense to have a systematic method for insuring that
those operating these very dangerous machines possess some minimum
acceptable knowledge of the rules of the road, as well as a minimum vision
requirement (with or without glasses), and a minimum level of competence
commensurate with the ability to safely operate the machine. Our licensing
system involves a written test about the rules of the road, vision tests
(including testing for red-green color blindness—a distinct disadvantage at
stoplights), and a hands-on driving test. The “diploma,” signifying the
successful completion of all of the criteria for qualifying to enter the ranks
of drivers, is the driver’s license.
The conditional permission built into the notion of a driver’s license also
provides a check and balance mechanism for denying access to these
machines to those who, despite performing the fifteen-minute driving test
satisfactorily, subsequently show themselves incapable or unwilling to use
their automobile safely or wisely. Thus, if a driver reveals that he or she is
an unsafe driver (e.g., an excessive number of moving violations,114 driving
while intoxicated, fleeing an injury accident, etc.), the driver’s license can
be revoked, thereby denying him or her the legal right to operate an
automobile on public roads.115 For those tending to carelessness, the threat
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of impending revocation alone might make them begin to exercise more
caution.
Moreover, the driver’s license provides a standardized mode of
identification. This form of identification is widely recognized and used by
various agencies and members of various law enforcement. For example,
many law enforcement agencies use an individual’s driver’s license to
conduct a quick computer search for outstanding warrants for criminal
offenses, traffic offensives, or other violations.
Requiring all drivers to possess a driver’s license combines what could
be termed an “actuarial” policy (i.e., on the average, those who complete
this process and maintain their licenses will be safer drivers than those who
have not) and a “bright line” policy (i.e., the driver is assumed competent if
he/she possesses a valid license, and is presumed incompetent if he/she has
no valid license, with no case by case assessment of competency). The fact
that someone is driving without a valid license neither causes actual harm
nor necessarily increases any risk of harm, unlike other driving offenses
such as reckless driving, driving while intoxicated, or vehicular homicide.
Someone without a valid license could be a very safe driver, as could
someone whose license had been suspended for reasons unrelated to his/her
safe operation of his/her vehicle. There is, in fact, no reason to believe in
any particular case that the driver without a valid license might not be a
better, safer driver than many with valid licenses. We all know the roads
are filled with terrible drivers, most of whom undoubtedly are driving with
valid licenses. In fact, it is challenging to drive more than a half an hour
without encountering someone you want to scream at for doing something
stupid and dangerous with his or her vehicle. In fairness, most of us have
had a moment of distraction or terrible judgment where we were the stupid
and dangerous ones who, but for fortune, would have caused a major
accident. So, again, the lack of a driver’s license by a particular individual
neither causes nor increases any risk of harm to themselves or to others.116
While there are studies that establish a correlation between drivers with
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revoked and suspended licenses and fatal accidents, these studies at best
only tell us about alcoholics who continue driving. As we will explain in
the next section, these studies have nothing to do with drivers whose
licenses have been revoked for non-payment of fines.
Our making it illegal to drive without a valid license does not reflect a
concern about individual criminality. Rather, the concern is a systematic
one in which ad hoc, case by case assessment of each driver’s ability to use
his/her automobile safely and legally must, as a practical matter, be limited
to a single, fifteen-minute driving test. This test leads to the presumption of
competence carried by the license. No license, no competence—a clear,
bright line.
We, therefore, criminalize and punish a person’s willingness to drive
without a valid driver’s license. It does not seem that we do so out of any
real retributive sense117 (neither author has any moral reaction to unlicensed
drivers—perhaps only a practical concern about their competence). Rather,
it is our desire for general deterrence118 which is at play. Our systematic
approach to insure a minimum, acceptable level of knowledge and
competency revolves around the necessary cultural fiction that this
knowledge and competency is reified in a small, rectangle of plasticprotected paper which we dub a driver’s license.119 Our system entirely
depends on you having a valid license to drive. We threaten punishment to
deter you from failing to work within this necessary system. But what
about revoking licenses for non-safety related reasons, and then threatening
larger fines and jail if that person continues to drive?
2. Revoking Driver’s Licenses to Collect Fines and Parking Tickets
Revoking a driver’s license because the driver has shown to be unsafe on
the road is totally appropriate. Giving the state the ability to revoke the
conditional permission built into the notion of a driver’s license once a
driver endangers or causes harm to others, is one of the rationales for
licensing. Drivers who display that they are incapable or unwilling to
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engage in this extremely dangerous activity in a reasonable manner simply
must be taken off the road. We are, after all, literally dealing with life and
death. But, as discussed at the beginning of this article, many licenses are
revoked for reasons totally unrelated to driving safety; rather, the
revocations are directly linked to failure to pay traffic fines.120
A Closer Look at the Issue of Safety
Currently, some individuals might respond that criminal penalties,
including incarceration, are justified for DWLS based on studies revealing a
significant correlation between drivers whose licenses have been suspended
or revoked and fatal automobile accidents.121 These studies show that in
twenty percent of fatal accidents in America, at least one of the drivers was
unlicensed.122 On a state by state comparison, the percentage of fatal
crashes involving at least one unlicensed driver range from a low of 6.1
percent (Maine) to a high of 23.1 percent (New Mexico).123 And one study
shows that, though numerically the vast number of fatal crashes involved
licensed drivers,124 drivers with a suspended or revoked license are 3.7
times more likely to be in a fatal crash than a legally licensed driver.125
This data sounds like pretty convincing support for dealing harshly with
those driving on suspended licenses like our Sally, until you look closer.
In fact, these studies primarily considered drivers whose licenses had
been suspended or revoked for driving under the influence of alcohol
(DUI).126 People who drink and drive are exceptionally dangerous.127 They
also tend to keep driving, even after one DUI conviction.128 Thus, one
might question whether it is more than coincidental that, in New Mexico,
the state which has the highest percentage of unlicensed drivers who are
involved in fatal accidents,129 over 66 percent of drivers whose licenses
were revoked for DUI continue to drive.130 Not surprisingly, police report
that alcohol is involved in a high percentage of fatal crashes.131
One plausible interpretation of these studies is that they tell us far less
about unlicensed drivers than about drunk drivers. Driving with a revoked
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license is really a proxy for a serious alcohol addiction. Therefore, these
studies tell us little more than what we already know about alcohol, drunk
drivers, and fatal accidents.
In contrast, there are no studies evaluating those driving with licenses
suspended for reasons unrelated to safety (e.g., non-payment of fines):
More recent work has begun to look more closely at drivers who
were suspended for reasons other than DUI violations, but details
describing those other subpopulations and statistically valid
evaluations of programs designed to address their specific needs
are lacking at this time.132
Though cited for the generic proposition that those found guilty of
DWLS are dangerous,133 the cited studies plainly have no bearing on our
situation. The main study offering the impressive 3.7:1 ratio focused its
analysis on two-car crashes in which only one person was found at fault (as
evidenced by the issuance of a ticket for a moving violation).134 The study
did not specifically correlate the lack of a valid license with fault. In other
words, the study never said unlicensed drivers were 3.7 times as likely to be
at fault in fatal crashes; rather, the study found that unlicensed drivers were
more likely to have been one of the drivers in a fatal crash, victim or
otherwise.135
In fact, even if we pretended that these studies involved license
revocations for unpaid fines, the inferences connecting those with
suspended licenses to fatal crashes still would be far from clear. Thus
pretending that those whose licenses were suspended for nonpayment of
fines were in the study, the inference from the 3.7:1 ratio in fatal crashes
would not necessarily lead to any conclusion about driver safety. That is
because, if we look at DWLS for nonpayment of a fine as generally being a
proxy for poverty, then we are talking about a subpopulation that is driving
crummy cars with poor safety features (e.g., no disk brakes, no airbags,
etc.). Thus, fatality could be more a function of the quality of vehicle a
low-income person can afford than the quality of his driving. In fact, some
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states found it economically unfeasible to impound cars for nonpayment of
fines, principally because the cars routinely were such “junkers” that they
were worth less than the fines owed.136 Of course, all of this is more than
speculation; it is fantasy. We only imagined that the study involved drivers
whose driver’s licenses were suspended for nonpayment of fines. In reality,
there is no such study.
It is thus apparent that the use of revocations, further fines, and
incarceration for the failure to pay traffic fines is not for the purpose of
keeping us safe while on the roadway. It is to collect revenue. The system
is not saying, “Do not drive without a license;” it is saying, “Do not drive
until you have paid your fines and tickets in which case you’ll get your
driver’s license back.” But the use of the criminal sanction for these ends,
and in the particular context of allowing or denying the ability to drive, has
very different social consequences than does the normal use of a
penological threat aimed at deterrence.
Take burglary as an example. As a society, we do not want individuals
to engage in burglary. We threaten jail to deter you and we will
“specifically deter”137 and “incapacitate”138 you by placing you in prison if
you are not deterred by the threat of the sanction and nevertheless choose to
commit the crime. But, as a society, we are comfortable in the belief that
no one needs to burgle.139 If you are a junkie, get treatment. If you cannot
afford your lifestyle, cut back and sell your toys. If you are too poor to pay
for food and shelter, seek out some public or private social service. If the
problem is that you simply do not enjoy conventional employment, then
prison is simply the inevitable cost of your chosen profession.
While, as an abstract proposition, no one needs to drive, reality may be
otherwise (at least when you’re living in an area, like all too many, where
no effective mass transportation system exists).140 All this merely reflects
what amounts to a cultural truth: the entire American lifestyle is built
around, and interwoven with, the automobile.141
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3. The Automobile and the Life it Created
After demonstrating the reliability of the “horseless carriage” through a
series of highly publicized demonstrations between 1906–1910,142 the
automobile was almost instantaneously transformed from “novelty to
necessity”143 in the American consciousness. In 1904, 54,590 automobiles
were registered in America.144 Eight years later, nearly a million were
registered.145 By 1920, eight million were registered.146 Likewise, sales
between 1904 and 1912 increased from 22,130 a year to 356,000 a year.147
In the process, America was transformed both socially and economically.148
Most obviously, automobiles changed the landscape and geography of
America as huge amounts of capital flowed to reshape society to fit the
car.149 Vast networks of roadways and highways150 responded to the call of
the motorcar for access and freedom, and the main streets and villages151 of
Norman Rockwell’s152 America gave way to businesses and shopping areas
relocated within “driving distance.”153 At the same time, city planners also
let the automobile dictate the way, adopting the “expensive and ultimately
unworkable policy of unlimited accommodation to the motorcar.”154
Thus, for better or worse, current American society is structured around
moving in cars. This reality carries both ideological and practical
dimensions. Ideologically, we are a culture which prizes freedom of
individual movement. The “open road,” the lure of what is “around the
next turn” is in some sense a modern replication of the psyche of our
pioneer ancestors who trekked across this land during the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries.155 This is a nation with unrestricted freedom of
travel.156 We have no internal borders, no visas to travel from state to state.
One can wake up in the morning and walk, drive, fly, or train in any
direction time if resources permit.
For most Americans, work and home are connected by roads. Without a
car, it is not easy to get to work.157 In fact, many jobs offering more than
the most minimum wages require that the applicant have a vehicle.158 This
includes most government positions and most construction jobs.159 For
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many, if you cannot drive, you cannot work. If you cannot work, you
cannot make money. If you cannot make money, more likely than not, you
cannot pay fines for tickets. So for the poor, who do not have the money to
pay their initial traffic fines, which then results in suspension of their
licenses, the legal mantra that “driving is a privilege not a right,”160 rings
hollow. The reality is that many need to keep driving, even though their
licenses are suspended.
This leads to another way in which our situation is different than
deterring a crime such as burglary. We do not want you to burgle, end of
story. While we do not want you to drive without a license, that is not the
end of the story. We are not indifferent to you being able to drive; we
affirmatively want you to be able to drive, at least when required for work,
obtaining food, clothing, shelter, and caring for family. So, therefore, the
proposition that if you cannot pay your fines and tickets, you simply cannot
afford to drive, fails to grasp the larger picture.
4. The Futility and Social Harm from Employing License Revocations
and Jail Time to Coerce Revenue.161
This current dilemma is no different in the twenty-first century than it
was in the 1300s. Debtor’s prison does not work when the debtor is
impoverished. No money will be collected while the debtor is incarcerated,
and he or she likely will be poorer when released. At the same time, the
fine, license, and revocation “cycle” clogs court calendars, uses up
significant police resources in the form of serving warrants, overcrowds the
jails, and costs a fortune in expenses to incarcerate the indigent driver. The
experience of the Washington courts bears witness to the counterproductive
results of ultimately using the threat of jail to collect fines:
The most important aspect of these revisions [in Washington law
in 1993] is that a driver can no longer be arrested on charges of
[failure to pay (FTP), failure to respond (FTR) to a summons, or
failure to appear (FTA)] at a hearing for a traffic infraction.
Instead, the authority to incarcerate a violator is now based on the
newly described crime of driving with a suspended license. In the
majority of cases, the chargeable crime is third-degree DWLS,
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based on an unpaid fine for a traffic infraction. The establishment
of these misdemeanor provisions [was] viewed as a viable means
of enforcing court orders and of reducing the high FTA/FTP rates
associated with traffic infractions.
The new laws backfired. FTA/FTP rates increased because
offenders failed to appear for hearings on the DWLS charge in
addition to failing to appear for hearings on the underlying charge
and failing to pay the original fine. Local courts were soon issuing
bench warrants in record numbers, and law enforcement officers
were executing a larger than average number of warrants during
routine traffic violations. As a result, jail costs increased
dramatically throughout the state, with unusual circumstances:
some rural sheriffs reported making the decision to let violators go
rather than cite them for DWLS third-degree, since local criminal
justice system costs were getting out of control.162
Moreover, as shown from the experience of using debtor’s prisons, from
the Middle Ages through the first half of the twentieth century, the real cost
of the practice falls on the wider society. If you cannot work because you
are not allowed to drive, we pay for social services and welfare for you and
your children.163 You do not contribute to societal productivity. You do
not pay taxes. You have less of a stake in the broader society; for work
engenders more than just earning economic income.164 You will be more
likely to try to get money through criminal means, or fill all the hours with
nothing to do and little sense of self-esteem by numbing yourself with
narcotics. Any children you have will live in a less stable home and likely
lack a strong, positive role model—all of which will extort a societal price
from future generations.165
D. Current, Yet Problematic, Solutions for Indigents to Pay Court
Fines
There are a variety of methods currently used by lower trial courts to
collect fines from low-income defendants. Before considering the efficacy
of each of these methods once a defendant’s license has been revoked for
nonpayment, we will first consider how each of these methods will likely
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impact the indigent defendant possessing a valid driver’s license who now
faces his first set of fines.166
1. Installment Plans and Deferred Payment Plans Generally
This system for alleviating unrealistic economic demands on the indigent
has proven somewhat effective in a number of court systems,167 and even
bears the imprimatur of the United States Supreme Court.168 However,
there are consequences if you fail to meet your payments. For instance, you
will be brought into court on a “show cause” hearing169 where the court will
require you to show why you should not be assessed the full amount now or
even thrown into jail for civil contempt (assuming you have the money)
until you pay. So what, you may respond; if you appear to be abusing the
leniency and accommodation that allows you to pay in installments, the
court has every right to make you come back and explain.
While this may seem to make complete sense, the situation has some
complex facets. The defendant may have paid his traffic fine, but, due to a
clerical mistake the fine still shows on his record. Or, the defendant may
have honestly believed he “sent that check out with the electricity bill and
car payment,”170 yet because of the transient and/or chaotic existence of the
indigent,171 he may have never received the notice of his court hearing.
Even if the defendant received the notice, he may have transportation
problems: his junker car broke down; his cousin who was to drive him
failed to show up. He may be afraid to jeopardize his job if he goes to court
and not to work, and yet be afraid to tell his supervisor about his legal
problems. Of course, if he does not show up to court, there will be charges,
fines, and other costs for failure to appear. A warrant will be issued and
warrant costs will be added to the original fine.172 When he is arrested, he
will be taken to jail where he will likely remain for a day or two before his
court appearance. As a result, the individual may lose his job, thus
inadvertently creating more financial strain on his ability to pay the court.
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All that said, offering payment plans is a welcome evolution in dealing with
spiraling fines and low-income defendants.
A New Generation of Rational Payment Plans that Still Fall Short
Some courts in Washington have begun a system that is sensitive to lowincome driver’s inability to pay their traffic fines. In one court system, a
special “relicensing calendar” gives first-time DWLS3 offenders a chance
to keep their licenses by setting up a payment plan. Once the defendant has
made the first payment, a hold is placed on their license suspension for a
year, during which time he can pay off the fine.173 In another Washington
court system, the DWLS3 offender meets in a session with an ombudsmen
and a representative of DOL to work out a payment plan. They then go to
criminal court, the defendant waives his right to a speedy trial, and the case
is continued ninety days, at which time the defendant must report on his
progress. If needed, the court will continue the case to give the defendant a
reasonable chance to pay off his fines and keep his license.174 In another
forum, a non-profit community agency works with the defendant,
interceding with the court on his behalf.175 The agency will work out a plan
where the court will withdraw the outstanding fines from collection, waive
the collection fees, set up a payment or community service plan, may
reduce the total fines, and lift the hold on the driver’s license as soon as the
first installment is paid. Some courts have even developed plans with
collection agencies, setting a low-income payment scale and lifting the
suspension after the first payment.176
All of these approaches are far preferable to previously available options
for the low-income driver who has lost his license due to nonpayment of
fines. Yet, all is not so rosy. If the defendant misses an installment
payment, he is off the plan.177 Once again, he will not have a valid license.
To get back on the plan, he will have to pay significant fees. If the plan
involves a collection agency, he may be required to pay 50 percent of the
total debt owed.178 For people so close to the margin, not having the extra
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money to pay an installment any particular month is not an unlikely
scenario. A lost job, a sick child, or a breakdown of the junker auto, may
cause the money to be unavailable that month. After all, this debt doesn’t
represent anything “real” in this person’s life; it is made up, a societal
construction which does not correlate to any human need like food,
clothing, and shelter. When the money is spent on fines, the indigent
person has nothing to show for it, except that the state may leave him alone.
So what will these well-intentioned payment plans really accomplish? For
some, it will all work out well. They will make their payments and keep
their licenses. But for many who are low-income, the plan which seemed
so promising at first will crumble. Soon, their licenses will be suspended
and the government will be on their backs—more fines, more arrests, more
warrants.179 For the state, whatever additional monies they collect through
these payment plans will be offset by costs for program administration,
warrants, court hearings, and other similar expenses.
Thus far, we have been talking about the working poor. However, many
people on welfare or Social Security Income (SSI)180 also need cars to shop
and take themselves and their children to the doctor. When the Department
of Social and Health Services (DSHS) allocates $440 per month for a
person to live, expecting the recipient to consistently pay $75 a month to a
court payment plan, where the money basically goes into the ozone, is a bit
unrealistic.
2. Community Service
Providing the option of community service to pay off fines is a
reasonable one so long as the defendant has legal transportation to get to the
site. In this payment alternative, a court has the discretion to allow
community service in lieu of paying a fine. The court has the discretion to
determine which fines may qualify for such a program. In the City of
Seattle, the defendant is credited $10 toward their fine for every hour of
community service.181 The problem, of course, is that while doing
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community service, the defendant cannot go to his job. In community
service the defendant earns “money,” but it can only go to fines, not to
life’s basic needs. The conterproductive possibilities from this scenario are
apparent. Time spent at community service cannot be devoted to seeking or
engaging in paying employment. In fairness, most courts are flexible about
when this service can be done, offering opportunities to fulfill the
community service on the weekend for those working during the week, and
vice versa.
While superficially appealing, using community service in the revoked
license context is problematic. Initially, giving the defendant the ability to
pay off his fines through community service does not give him a driver’s
license, at least not until the fine is paid off. At a scale like Seattle’s $10
rate, paying off a fine which could be thousands of dollars would require
well over one hundred hours of service, and, thus, would deny the
defendant a license for a very long time. This service also would consume
large blocks of time which otherwise could be dedicated to finding and/or
going to work. This impediment to being reasonably available to the
employment market would be further exacerbated by the fact that the
defendant still cannot legally drive (even to the community service site).
Admittedly, this dilemma could be obviated if, analogous to payment
plans, the defendant would receive a license upon completing a set number
of community service hours, and then making monthly “installment
payments” of community service hours.182 Putting aside the cost and
burden of the administrative structure needed to maintain the long-term
accounts required for multiple “installment payments,” problems may arise
during a month that an installment payment is owed (e.g., the defendant’s
child becomes ill, a car breaks down, the defendant must suddenly move
from her home to a shelter to flee domestic violence).
At this point, familiar problems arise. Plainly, the defendant could go
into court and explain the situation. But, if his life is in chaos, it may be
unrealistic to expect him to take the initiative to set a court hearing date on
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his own (particularly, given the “sociology of poverty,” discussed infra
section E, subsection 1). The court could, of course, send notice to the
defendant and set a hearing, but that raises all the problems of the lack of
reliable communication in the life of many low-income people.183 If a
hearing is set and the defendant fails to show up, presumably his license
will be revoked again. He might never receive notice of the revocation and,
once again, unwittingly be driving on a revoked license. Once arrested and
brought back into court for this new DWLS3 charge, he will owe even more
money, including costs like those accompanying reinstatement with the
community service payment plan.
3. Collection Agencies
Many courts now contract with collection agencies to which they assign
delinquent traffic fines.184 Notices from collection agencies certainly work
with the authors—our credit is a big deal. We are not saying that the
indigent are indifferent to such things.185 They want to buy cars, and many
dream of one day pulling themselves out of poverty and owning a house.
All in all, referring unpaid fines to collection agencies is far more socially
beneficial and rational than simply holding defendants in contempt and
jailing them. Nevertheless, there are some problems. Poorer citizens are
often transient and do not maintain a reliable means of receiving notices
and communications (like those from collection agencies) as do more
economically stable members of our society.186 Moreover, collection
agencies add fees on top of the fines, which can mount over time creating a
nearly insurmountable economic burden for the indigent.187 While
collection agencies sometimes offer payment plans geared to low-income
defendants, the availability of such a payment option may vary with the
particular court, with the same collection agency offering this option for
defendants from some courts in the jurisdiction and not others.188 Also,
collection agencies offering a payment plan geared to low-income
defendants may add the traffic fines to any other debt the defendant owes
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which is also under collection (e.g., furniture), and will only send notice to
the court of fulfillment of the defendant’s obligations when all amounts
owed (including those not resulting from traffic infractions) are eventually
paid.189
Finally, there is another factor at play. A representative interviewed from
the non-profit community-based organization that helps people reactivate
their licenses explained that of the 150 people they see each month, 75
percent could get back their licenses, yet only 20 percent of this group did
so.190 Why? This is a function of what one could term “the sociology of
poverty.”
E. The Difficulties Continue: A Recommendation to Scrap the Entire
Enterprise
1. The Sociology of Poverty
A report by Washington State courts concluded that the great majority of
those caught in the cycle of unpaid tickets, failed court appearances, and
revoked licenses were not in that situation due to negligence or
indifference; they simply were not capable of dealing with the court system
which both intimidated and overwhelmed191 them with its perceived
complexity.192 In that regard, their inability to work through the court
system likely parallels experiences many of us have had with large,
bureaucratic institutions. As Professor Lawrence Shulman has noted,
The reader can surely provide numerous examples in which the
size and complexity of a system, difficulties in communications, or
the ambivalence of the system towards its clients cuts them off
from the services they require. Since the individual who needs to
use the system is also complex, feels some ambivalence towards
the service, and has difficulty in communications, breakdowns
become almost inevitable.193
Also, the conclusion of the Washington State Report is completely
consistent with social work research that has found that the strength of a
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person’s motivations to pursue and complete a given goal is strongly
influenced by their own belief in their capability to achieve the goal. This
concept, termed “self-efficacy belief,”194
. . . ‘determine[s] their level of motivation, as reflected in how
much effort they will exert and how long they will persevere in the
face of obstacles.’ Research has suggested that the stronger the
belief in one’s capabilities, the stronger will be the effort to reach
the goal.195
Most of us understand this from our own experiences, probably those
from school. If we felt unsure of solving algebra problems with several
unknowns, we would half-heartedly struggle for a while, and then throw
down our pencils. No one can function without self-confidence. Of course,
part of that confidence is actually having the requisite knowledge and skills.
In other words, our confidence problem in algebra may have been justified
by a lack of knowledge, and we needed to meet with the teacher to work on
solving these equations.
Life skills—effectively organizing, communicating, negotiating your
way through governmental institutions and private bureaucracies—are no
different. A well-regarded approach to social work is based on the
construct that the clients actually possess the skills needed to cope,196 but
that they do not recognize their own capabilities. Nonetheless, social
workers recognize that some individuals lack skills needed to effectively
interact with other individuals and institutions, and that these skills must be
imparted.
For example, the Director of Social Work Clinical Field Studies at
Seattle University, herself a social worker with twenty-five years
experience, told us that
An emerging trend in programs such as homeless transitional
housing is to incorporate a one-on-one relationship with a
casework manager into the project. The manager will require
weekly meetings, both to develop the necessary habit of keeping
track of and fulfilling regular commitments with those in authority
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and to install life skills, such as setting goals, budgeting, keeping a
checking account, planning menus, shopping for food, and such.
Alternatively, part of the commitment may be to attend a series of
weekly life skills classes.197
Helping impart these skills (directly or indirectly through appropriate
resources) thus is as much a part of the social worker’s world as teaching
how to solve particular equations is of the algebra teacher’s.
Skills training. One gift that the social worker can bring to clients
is the knowledge of particular skills for living that clients may find
give them new options, which can be empowering because by
using those skills clients may come to have more voice and
influence over their worlds.198
In fact, when discussing the type of “coping skills” that are needed to
interact with institutions, one social work text notes:
This method goes beyond simply giving information; you will be
teaching clients skills in manipulating their environment so as to
achieve desired outcomes. You may need to teach clients how to
claim their rights and entitlements. Teaching coping skills
require[s] a painstaking consideration of the small details of daily
living.199
Everyone reading this article possesses these skills to a greater or lesser
degree. Most of us did not consciously study or train to learn them. These
skills were imparted in the fabric of our daily reality. This is obviously not
the case for so many of those whose licenses have been suspended for
failure to pay fines, and who are now trapped in “the cycle.”
2. Decriminalization of DWLS for Nonpayment of Fines: A Beginning
Recently, there have been discussions in Washington about
decriminalizing DWLS3 for nonpayment of fines.200 This would eliminate
debtor’s prison for low-income individuals, and save local jurisdictions the
costs associated with enforcement by police, the large expense of criminal
court resources, and the costs of incarceration. But, low-income people
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would still not have their driver’s licenses. They would keep driving, keep
getting cited for DWLS3 and various equipment-related tickets, and just
owe more and more to the state than they would ever be able to pay.
3. The Solution: The Choice Not to Revoke for Nonpayment
In the previous section we looked at various options for dealing with the
loss of a driver’s license due to nonpayment of fines. We concluded that
none of these options are appropriate and that the entire notion of revoking
driver’s licenses for nonpayment of fines should be rejected. So, where
does this leave us? If a driver signs a promise to appear and fails to appear
(FTA), a warrant should issue. The authority of the court must be
respected, and those flaunting that authority cannot be ignored. If drivers
simply do not pay tickets, however, the state should collect the money
through any of the methods we discussed.201 Also, as an additional
incentive to payment, we need to educate people about the consequences of
not paying tickets on their credit record.202 From the experience of all the
attorneys and agency members we have interviewed, other than a relatively
small group of scofflaws (estimated at 8 to 10 percent),203 most people want
to pay their tickets. They just do not have the money; they are low-income
and just holding on, or truly impoverished. Even if it turns out that much of
the money they owe will not be not collected by the methods we have
discussed,204 as we have seen, the economic and social costs of using
driver’s licenses as a wedge to collect money leaves the net balance of
society’s balance sheet overwhelmingly in the red.205

CONCLUSION
Whatever solution one arrives at for the problem of collecting fines,
society should never revoke a driver’s license for non-safety related issues.
Using revocation to collect revenue is the functional heir of the debtor’s
prison. Most low-income individuals need to drive to continue working.
But if they continue to drive, they will go to jail, avoidable only by paying
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the monies owed—monies they do not have. This current variant on what
is basically a medieval theme replicates that same futility and resultant
harm to the interests of the wider society that debtor’s prison has always
borne. While it is beyond the scope of this article to recommend the best
option for collecting fines from low-income people, we have discussed a
number of reasonable methods. However, courts simply must come to
accept that government cannot even partially fund itself on the backs of the
poor by using the threat of incarceration. It is time for the courts to stop
hitting their heads against the wall.
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license suspension [i.e., driver is eligible to regain driver’s license once fulfills specific
conditions] or revocation [i.e., loss of driver’s license for specific time period, with
conditions to re-obtain once period passes] to combat recidivism rates for Driving While
Intoxicated (DWI) and Driving Under the Influence (DUI). Many of these states also
suspend or revoke driving privileges for failure to pay or appear in court in response to
traffic infractions.” MARTI MAXWELL, INSTITUTE FOR COURT MANAGEMENT, COURT
EXECUTIVE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM PHASE III PROJECT: NEW STRATEGIES
ADDRESSING THE IMPACT OF DRIVER’S LICENSE SUSPENSIONS [8] (May 2001),
available at
http://www.ncsonline.org/D_ICM/Research_Papers_2001/The_Suspended_Driver.pdf.
Washington State is among the states suspending driver’s licenses for nonpayment of
fines. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 46.20.289, 46.20 291(5) (2005); JOAN FEREBEE,
INSTITUTE FOR COURT MANAGEMENT, COURT EXECUTIVE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
PHASE III PROJECT: BEST PRACTICES FOR COLLECTION OF TRAFFIC FINES IN THE
EDMONDS MUNICIPAL COURT 33–34 (May 2001), available at
http://www.ncsonline.org/D_ICM/Abstracts_2001/Best_Practices.pdf. States with
similar practices are (1) Ohio, FEREBEE, supra, at 50, (2) Maryland, id. at 49, (3)
neighboring Oregon, ROBERT A. SCOPATZ, ET AL., AAA FOUNDATION FOR TRAFFIC
SAFETY, UNLICENSED TO KILL—THE SEQUEL 43 (Jan. 2003), available at
http://www.aaafoundation.org/pdf/UnlicensedToKill2.pdf, and (4) Florida, id. at 32.
4
In the State of Washington, driving when your driver’s license has been suspended for
nonpayment of fines is designated “driving while license suspended or revoked in the
third degree” (DWLS3º), and classified as a misdemeanor. WASH. REV. CODE §
46.20.342(1)(c)(iv) (2005).
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5

In the State of Washington, a misdemeanor is punishable by up to ninety days in jail.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.20.021(3) (2005). Throughout the state, there are courts that
sentence multiple offenders to several months in county jail. See Interview with Mary
Wolney, former Senior Attorney in the Defenders Association of King County, Seattle,
WA. (June 30, 2005) (on file with authors). Ms. Wolney, a former Senior Attorney in the
Defender Association of King County, Washington, is considered the leading authority
on suspended driver’s licenses on both a state and national level.
6
“Specific deterrence is an alternative utilitarian goal. Here, D’s punishment is meant
to deter future misconduct by D. Specific deterrence may occur in two ways. First, there
is deterrence by incapacitation: D’s imprisonment prevents him from committing crimes
in the outside society during the period of segregation. Second, upon release, there is
deterrence by intimidation: D’s punishment reminds him that if he returns to a life of
crime, he will experience more pain.” See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING
CRIMINAL LAW 10 (Matthew Bender & Co. ed., 2d ed. 1995) (footnote omitted); See also
RICHARD G. SINGER & JOHN Q. LA FOND, CRIMINAL LAW: EXAMPLES AND
EXPLANATIONS 19 (2d ed. 2001).
7
Though “Sally Jones” is an obvious pseudonym, her story is real. See Interview with
Mary Wolney, supra note 5.
8
None of this was unusual: “Over 40 percent of traffic violation defendants do not pay
their overdue fines.” FEREBEE, supra note 3, at 7.
9
There are “people who simply forgot about the court appearance or fine and who had
their licenses suspended because of honest or careless oversight.” MAXWELL, supra note
3, at [30].
10
WASH. REV. CODE § 3.62.090 (2005).
11
Adding the Washington statutory penalty of $25 to a $22 “state assessment,” makes
the penalty for not responding an additional $47 on top of the ticket. FEREBEE, supra
note 3, at 27; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 46.63.110(4) (2005).
12
In Washington, collection agencies, which contract with a local court, add 30%.
Interview with Mary Wolney, supra note 5. Or even up to 50% onto the original ticket
and added court costs, FEREBEE, supra note 3, at 34 (“A reasonable fee, not to exceed
50% of the outstanding debt . . .”). See also WASH. REV. CODE § 19.16.500 (2005)
(permits courts and other governmental bodies to employ collection agencies to recoup
fines); WASH. REV. CODE § 46.63.110(d) (2005) (courts can contract with “outside
entities” to administer payment plans).
13
See Interview with Mary Wolney, supra note 5.
14
In Redmond v. Moore, 91 P.3d 875 (Wash. 2004), the Washington Supreme Court
found it unconstitutional to suspend licenses for nonpayment of fines, without
opportunity for a hearing. Id. at 677. After a year moratorium following Moore on all
suspension of licenses for nonpayment, new legislation went into effect requiring at least
a phone or e-mail hearing if requested. 2005 Wash. Sess. Laws 1094, 2005 Wash. Legis.
Serv. Ch. 288 (West). The legislation also gave amnesty to the over 200,000 people
whose licenses had been revoked under the old regime (even though they still had unpaid
fines). See Candace Heckman, Rules on Suspended License Ease Tomorrow, SEATTLE
POST INTELLIGENCER, June 30, 2005, at B1. The new legislation reinstituted revocation
of driver’s licenses for non-payment of fines. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.63.110(6)(b)
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(2005). At the same time, it set up a payment plan system which allows defendants to reobtain their licenses. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.63.110(6) (2005). Specifically, when in its
discretion a court determines that a defendant cannot pay the fines at once, the court
“shall” set up a payment plan “of reasonable payments based on the financial ability of
the person to pay.” Id. Upon receiving the first payment, the court will notify the
department of licensing, and “the department shall rescind any suspension of the person’s
driver’s license or driver’s privilege based on [previous] failure to respond to that
infraction.” Id. If, however, the defendant has had a previous payment plan for the same
fine(s) or a payment plan on other fines that the defendant failed to complete, the court
has the discretion not to put the defendant on a plan and instead demand payment of all
monies due. Id.
15
See Interview with Mary Wolney, supra note 5.
16
In fact, in Washington State, the officer could have just run her plates and determined
that she was a suspended driver. See State v. McKinney, 60 P.3d 46, 52 (Wash. 2001)
(no expectation of privacy in license plates, driving record). Also, Washington has a
statute which permits a temporary detention, see generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968), of any car registered to a person whose license has been suspended or revoked
(providing the driver fits the physical description of the suspended driver). See, REV.
CODE WA 46.20.349. Other states issue special license plates to alert police to the
suspended status of the suspended registered owner. See, FEREBEE supra note 3, at 20
(Oregon), 42 (Minnesota).
17
While many jurisdictions in Washington have public defenders stationed in court
where criminal traffic defendants make their first appearance, “[u]nfortunately, in many
courts no public defender is available and the judge does not conduct the thorough
inquiry the case law contemplates to support a valid waiver.” Robert C. Boruchowitz,
The Right to Counsel: Every Accused Person’s Right, WSBA BAR NEWS, Jan. 2004, at
25 [hereinafter Boruchowitz, Right to Counsel]. The situation, moreover, “is not limited
to Washington.” Robert C. Boruchowitz, How to Deal with the Denial of Counsel in
Misdemeanor Cases Post-Shelton, THE ADVOCATE, Jan. 4, 2005, at 8. [hereinafter
Boruchowitz, Denial of Counsel]. The lack of counsel in DWLS3º cases, cases which
basically entail collecting a series of documents from the DOL, routinely results in
immediate pleas, even though there is a range of available and effective defenses
focusing on the accuracy of the underlying information, the legal basis for the suspension
order, and the legality of the notice. See Interview with Mary Wolney, supra note 5.
18
The reporter for the Municipal Court of Edmonds study recognized this economic
spiral when she wrote: “In the State of Washington this is a criminal offense with a
penalty of up to $1,000 and up to nintey days in jail. This creates another fine the
defendant most likely will not be able to pay.” FEREBEE, supra note 3, at 10–11.
19
In interviews with those familiar with DWLS3º, the consensus was that 90% of the
defendants wanted to pay their tickets, they just lacked the resources. See Interview with
Mary Wolney, supra note 5; See Interview with LaVerne Jones, Counselor at Central
Area Motivation Program (CAMP), Seattle, WA. (June 28, 2005) [hereinafter Interview
with LaVerne Jones]. Miss Jones is a counselor at CAMP, a community-based, nonprofit organization which has contracted with the Seattle Municipal Court to help people
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get re-licensed after suspension. See MAXWELL, supra note 3, at [7–8] (discussing
CAMP re-licensing program). See Interview with LaVerne Jones, supra.
20
Ironically, even maintaining the car is extremely expensive for the low-income
defendant. See Bureau of Trans. Statistics, National Trans. Statistics: Table 3-14:
Average Cost of Owning and Operating an Automobile (2004), available at
http://www.bts.gov/publications/national_transportation_statistics/2004/html/table_03_1
4.html.
21
It is estimated statewide that 30-70% of suspended or revoked drivers continue to
drive, MAXWELL, supra note 3, at [10], with an estimate of 50% for Seattle, id. at 9.
This is consistent with national findings that the majority of suspended drivers still drive
sometimes. SCOPATZ ET AL., supra note 3, at 9.
22
See, e.g., MAXWELL, supra note 3, at [29] (“A random review of 60 third-degree
DWLS cases revealed an average of 4.6 financial responsibility (lack of insurance)
citations per defendant. On this charge, it is very easy for defendants to accumulate
several thousands dollars’ worth of fines in a short period of time”.). See also id. at [41]
(“In the fall of 2000, for example, state researchers analyzed a sample of nineteen people
serving time in Yakima County Jail for third-degree DWLS. These prisoners had an
average of $8,000 in fines, ranging from $4,000 to $24,000.”).
23
“Many low income workers must work evening or late-night shifts, when public
transportation is either infrequent or nonexistent. Parents also need to take their young
children to daycare before work and pick them up afterwards.” Id. at [37-38]. Further,
what mass transportation is available to the poor is often poorly maintained and
unreliable. JANE HOLTZ KAY, ASPHALT NATION: HOW THE AUTOMOBILE TOOK OVER
AMERICA AND HOW WE CAN TAKE IT BACK 36-37 (1997) (“Even low-income
neighborhoods fortunate enough to have trains or street cars tell tales of service run
amiss—of broken escalators for hospital-bound Harlem riders, of a Chicago elevated
train so broken down that the transit authorities attached an empty car at the end to buffer
bumps.”). Some have contended that deliberate, corrupt actions by the automobile
industry are part of the cause of our nation’s inadequate mass transportation system. See,
e.g., JAMES J. FLINK, THE AUTOMOBILE AGE 364-65 (1988) [hereinafter FLINK,
AUTOMOBILE AGE].
24
For a description of the various public and private re-licensing programs in
Washington, see, MAXWELL, supra note 3, at [31–39]; Boruchowitz, Right to Counsel,
supra note 17, at 28-29; Boruchowitz, Denial of Counsel, supra note 17, at 9-10; District
Court, Clark County Washington, Driver’s License Restoration,
http//www.clark.wa.gov/courts/district/license.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2005);
Washington Courts, “Courts of Limited Jurisdiction—Delivery Services Work Group
Meeting (July 31, 2003), available at
http://www.courts.wa.gov/programs_orgs/poss_bja/?fa=pos_bja.cftf&cftf=wg_dj_min_2
0030731. See also supra note 14 (discussion of mandated payment plan under new
Washington statute, WASH. REV. CODE § 46.63.110(6)).
25

At last Mr. Micawber’s [financial] difficulties came to a crisis, and he was
arrested early one morning, and carried over to the King’s Bench Prison in the
Borough. He told me, as he went out of the house, that the God of day had
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now gone down upon him—and I really thought his heart was broken and
mine too. But I heard, afterwards, that he was seen to play a lively game at
skittles, before noon.
On the first Sunday after he was taken there, I was to go and see him, and
have dinner with him. I was to ask my way to such a place, and just short of
that place I should see such another place, and just short of that I should see a
yard, which I was to cross, and keep straight on until I saw a turnkey. All this
I did; and when at last I did see a turnkey (poor little fellow that I was!), and
thought how, when Roderick Random was in debtor’s prison, there was a man
there with nothing on him but an old rug, the turnkey swam before my
dimmed eyes and beating heart.”
CHARLES DICKENS, DAVID COPPERFIELD 188 (Tom Doherty Assocs. 1998) (1870).
26
PATRICK O’BRIEN, POST CAPTAIN 87 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1972) (“Captain Aubrey .
. . they have come to arrest you for debt.”).
27
E-mail from Doralyn DeLeGarde, Management Analyst, Driver’s Responsibility
Section, Washington State Department of Licensing, to Kelly Kunsch, Reference
Librarian, Seattle University School of Law (June 15, 2005) (on file with authors).
28
See Interview with Mary Wolney, supra, note 5. Cf. MAXWELL, supra note 3, at [40]
(In a Wisconsin study, the results “showed that 58 percent of all [driver’s] license
suspensions in the county were the result of failure to pay a traffic fine. The highest
suspension rates were for residents of low-income neighborhoods that qualified for
Community Development Block Funds. . . . These are the same areas that tend to have
higher concentrations of minority residents”.).
29
See MAXWELL, supra note 3, at [15]. “20% to 30% of all misdemeanors in Seattle are
DWLS third degree . . .” Id. at [13].
30
In Washington State, “courts of limited jurisdiction” refers to the courts handling
criminal misdemeanors: the district courts (county) and municipal courts (city). “More
than two million cases are filed each year in Washington’s District and Municipal Courts,
representing seven out of every eight cases filed in the state (parking violations
excluded).” Id. at [3]. 61.6% of these involve criminal traffic violations. Id.
31
Moore, 91 P.3d 875.
32
WASH. REV. CODE § 46.63.110 (2005).
33
Richard Ford, Imprisonment for Debt, 25 MICH. L. REV. 24, 24 (1926-27).
34
Id. at 24–25.
35
Id. at 25.
36
Id. See also Derek A. Westen, Fines, Imprisonment, and the Poor: “Thirty Dollars or
Thirty Days,” 57 CAL. L. REV. 778, 779 (1968); Becky A. Vogt, State v. Allison:
Imprisonment for Debt in South Dakota, 46 S. D. L. REV. 334, 334-55 (2001). See also
Vogt, supra, at 338-39 & n.42, 43 (discussion of Rome’s first written law, “the Twelve
Tables,” which, in part, laid out the rules for collection of civil debt).
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37

See Ford, supra note 33, at 28; see generally PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS IN AMERICA–INSOLVENCY, IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT AND BANKRUPTCY,
1607-1900 (The State Historical Society of Wisconsin 1974).
38
See Ford, supra note 33, at 25.
39
See id. at 25.
40
Id.
41
See id. at 27; COLEMAN, supra note 37, at 4–5; Vogt, supra note 36, at 341–42.
42
In BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 208 (6th ed. 1990), Capias ad respondendum (AKA,
Mesne) is defined as:
A judicial writ (usually simply termed a ‘capias’, and commonly abbreviated
to ‘ca. resp.’) by which actions at law were frequently commenced; and which
commands the sheriff to take the defendant, and him safely keep, so that he
may have his body before the court on a certain day, to answer the plaintiff in
the action. It notifies defendant to defend suit and procures his arrest until
security for plaintiff’s claim is furnished.
Id. See also Ford, supra note 33, at 27–28; Vogt, supra note 36, at 334–35 & n.2;
Note, Present Status of Execution Against the Body of the Judgment Debtor, 42
IOWA L. REV. 306, 307 n.10 (1956-57) [hereinafter Note, Present Status]; HUGH
BARTY-KING, THE WORST POVERTY: A HISTORY OF DEBT AND DEBTORS 5 (1991).
In America, use of this process was not without cost to the creditor; for if they chose
Mesne, they lost the right to seize the debtor’s property—you got the body or
property, not both. See COLEMAN, supra note 37, at 5.
43
See Note, Present Status, supra note 42, at 312.
44
See Vogt, supra note 36, at 341.
45
In BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 208 (6th ed. 1990), Capias ad satisfaciendum is
defined as:
A writ of execution (usually termed, for brevity, a “ca. sa”), which commands
the sheriff to take the party named, and keep him safely, so that he may have
his body before the court on a certain day, to satisfy the damages or debt and
images in certain actions. It deprives the party taken of his liberty until he
makes the satisfaction awarded. A body execution enabling judgment creditor
in specified types of actions to cause arrest of judgment debtor and his
retention in custody until he either pays judgment or secures his discharge as
an insolvent debtor.
Id. See also Ford, supra note 33, at 28; Vogt, supra note 36, at 334–35 & n.3.
Vogt, supra note 36, at 342; COLEMAN, supra note 37, at 5. “[S]ome debtors arrested
on mesne process protected their assets from seizure by electing to remain in jail. This
waiting strategy assumed that the creditor would eventually relent, if only because he
gained nothing except perhaps malicious satisfaction from keeping a debtor in prison.
COLEMAN, supra note 37, at 9. See also Vogt, supra note 36, at 345 (similarly, in
America, “some debtors chose to remain in prison rather than be stripped of their
assets”).
46
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47

COLEMAN, supra note 37, at 5. Cf. Westen, supra note 36, at 779 (“In the Middle
Ages in England an individual unable to pay a fine could remain in prison for life.”).
48
See COLEMAN, supra note 37, at 4-5, 9; Vogt, supra note 36, at 335, 343.
49
See Ford, supra note 33, at 28. The notion of a federal debtor’s prison was finally
abolished in 1948. Criminal Law—Alabama Raises the Rates at which Individuals in
Jail for Nonpayment of Fines Earn Out Their Debts, 116 HARV. L. REV. 735, 735 (2002).
See also 28 U.S.C. § 2007(a) (2005) (“A person shall not be imprisoned for debt
[through] process issued from a court of the United States in any State wherein
imprisonment for debt has been abolished.”).
50
See BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF
AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 85–86 (2002).
51
Ford, supra note 33, at 29. Interestingly, in the South, though the institution of
slavery flourished, imprisonment for debt was all but nonexistent. See id. at 28–29. On
the other hand, during this same period, imprisonment for debt was utilized in every
European country except Portugal. Id. at 30.
52
For an argument that courts’ use of their contempt power to coerce payment of taxes
and child support is functionally a resort to debtor’s prison, see Richard E. James, Putting
Fear Back Into The Law And Debtors Back in Prison: Reforming the Debtor’s Prison
System, 42 WASHBURN L. REV. 143, 148 (2002).
53
See id at 157 (“By the early nineteenth century, several states had constitutions that
prohibited imprisonment for debt, and by the early twentieth century, most of the fortyeight states had followed suit either through their constitution or by statute.”); Vogt,
supra note 36, at 347. Calls for the abolition of debtor’s prison long preceded the
widespread abandonment: Then [when debtor’s prison is abolished] the barbarism of an
age that could tolerate a debtor’s prison will seem less than that of those dreadful times
when prisoners were tortured to made confession against themselves. See William Henry
Arnoux, Civil Imprisonment, 24 ALB. L.J. 106 (1881–82).
54
The use of Mesne in modern America, varied from state to state, and lasted into the
1960s. Ford, supra note 33, at 32–33. After the 1830s, state constitutions and statutes
took one of three forms: (1) those totally prohibiting Mesne, (2) those permitting Mesne
in tort, and (3) those forbidding Mesne in contract. See Note, Present Status, supra note
42, at 307-08. The laws were further complicated by the various exceptions to the use of
body attachment (i.e. Mesne) that a particular state might recognize, such as the class of
debtor (e.g., no females or minors), the amount of the debt and the cause of action (e.g.,
contract vs. fraud), and specific findings of fact that first had to be found by a court (e.g.,
the acts or omissions by the debtor were “malicious”). Id. at 310. See also Ford, supra
note 33, at 34 (author notes wide use of Mesne in 1950s Michigan).
55
In 1872, one scholar decried the availability of Mesne, noting “[h]owever wise or
judicious these provisions of the code may be, in and of themselves[,] in the hands of
rapacious plaintiffs and unscrupulous lawyers, they have been turned into the instruments
of oppression and extortion.” See Arrests in Civil Actions, 5 ALB. L.J. 243 (1872). See
also Henry C. Robinson, Attachment of the Body Upon Civil Process, 7 YALE L. J. 295,
295 (1897-98) (noting the “practice . . . is said to be not infrequently used by miscreants
who get into the profession”).
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Yet even in the 1950s, “shyster lawyers” from “small firms practicing in immigration
populations” crafted their pleadings (i.e., characterizing every contract as a fraud action)
to raise the threat of incarceration to the debtor. See Ford, supra note 33, at 45. In fact,
the use of Mesne to coerce collection of debts in Michigan increased simultaneously with
the adoption of a statute in 1925 restricting the use of garnishment. Id. at 46.
56
Under court rules similar to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, this type of practice would subject the
plaintiff’s attorney to sanctions for signing and filing a pleading which is being presented
for an “improper purpose, such as to harass . . .” and which is legally frivolous. FED. R.
CIV. P. 11(b)(1), (2). The attorney would be subject to sanctions if the attorney did not
make a reasonable inquiry of the facts and law before signing and presenting the
offensive document. See Simon DeBartolo Group, L.P. v. Richard E. Jacobs Group, Inc.,
186 F.3d 157, 166 (2d. Cir. 1999). This conduct would also run afoul of rules of
professional responsibility. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2002);
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBITLITY STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES 68–69 (John S.
Dzienkowski ed., 2001-2002) (noting attorneys cannot bring frivolous cause of action).
Rule 11, however, by its terms only applies to pleadings “present[ed] to the court,”
and not to an oral or written threat to file a pleading. See FED R. CIV. P. 11(b). So, what
if the unscrupulous attorney threatens a less educated debtor with filing a pleading that
on its face permits Mesne? Again, that would be a matter of professional ethics, and
enforcement would depend on the debtor going to the Bar, which seems unlikely under
these circumstances. See e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1(a);
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra, at 87-88 (noting a lawyer “shall not knowingly
make a false statement of material fact to a third person...”).
57
While Mesne appears to have disappeared from the legal landscape, it is unclear
whether legal regimes still leave room for its use. See, e.g., WASH. CONST. art. I, § 17
(no imprisonment for debt, “except in case of absconding debtors”). An “absconding
debtor” has been defined as “one who leaves or is about to leave, the jurisdiction, or who
conceals himself [to avoid process].” Burrichter v. Cline, 28 P. 367, 368 (Wash. 1891).
See also COLO. CONST. art. II, § 12 (no imprisonment for debt, “unless upon refusal to
deliver up his estate for benefit of his creditors in such a manner as shall be prescribed by
law, or in cases of tort or where there is a strong presumption of fraud.”); ARIZ. CONST.
art. II, § 18 (“no imprisonment for debt, except in cases of fraud”).
58
See Westen, supra note 36, at 779.
59
See generally id.; Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243 (1970).
60
See Westen, supra note 36, at 779. See also Note, The Equal Protection Clause and
Imprisonment of the Indigent for Nonpayment of Fines, 64 MICH. L. REV. 938, 939 n.8
(1965–1966) (“Periodic studies of Philadelphia’s Reed Street Prison and the Baltimore
County Jail between 1940 and 1950 indicated that approximately 60% of all persons
imprisoned in these institutions had been committed for nonpayment of fines.”)
[hereinafter Note, Equal Protection].
61
See Westen, supra note 36, at 780. After 449 B.C., the “Twelve Tables,” became the
first known written code of Rome which put all the oral laws into written form. Vogt,
supra note 36, at 338–39. “The laws specified the amount of compensation to be offered
for various injuries and required an injured party to accept an offer of compensation.”
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Westen, supra note 36, at 781. See also ANCIENT ROMAN STATUTES 10 (Clyde Pharr,
ed., Allan Johnson et al., trans., University of Texas Press 1961).
62
See Westen, supra note 36, at 780. See also Exodus 21–22, in TANAKH: A NEW
TRANSLATION OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES ACCORDING TO TRADITIONAL HEBREW TEXT
(The Jewish Publication Society 1985).
63
See Westen, supra note 36, at 782.
64
Id.
65
William the Conqueror (ca. 1028–1087) was the Duke of Normandy. In 1066, he
sailed to England, defeated the Anglo-Saxons at the Battle of Hastings, and was crowned
King. E.g., NEW YORK TIMES, GUIDE TO ESSENTIAL KNOWLEDGE 1069 (2004).
66
See Westen, supra note 36, at 783.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 784.
70
Id. at 784-85. Williams, 399 U.S. at 239 (imprisonment for nonpayment of a fine
“dates back to medieval England”).
71
See Williams, 399 U.S. at 240; Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 399 (1971). See, e.g.,
James, supra note 52, at 182; Note, Equal Protection, supra note 60, at 939, 946; See
also Incarceration of Indigents Unable to Pay Criminal Fines, 84 HARV. L. REV. 46, 4748, 51–52 (1970–71) [hereinafter Incarceration of Indigents].
72
See supra note 60.
73
Imprisonment for criminal fines, regardless of the practical effect, has never been
characterized as involving debtor’s prison. Medieval English courts viewed enforcement
of fines as a function of the court’s contempt power. See, e.g., Ford, supra note 33, at 26;
Westen, supra note 36, at 806–7.
74
The equal protection argument, raised so forcefully in 1969 by Derek A. Westen,
supra note 36, at 796, and in 1966 in Note, Equal Protection, supra note 60, had been
clearly articulated in 1881: “In the first place, no law abridging the liberty of the citizen
should be permitted to remain upon the statute books of a free and enlightened people
that metes out a different punishment to the poor and friendless from that imposed on
others.” Arnoux, supra note 52.
75
Williams, 399 U.S. at 242–43.
76
Tate, 401 U.S. at 397-98.
77
See Williams, 399 U.S. at 243; Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 669–70 (1983)
(“The State, of course, has a fundamental interest in appropriately punishing persons—
rich and poor—who violate its criminal laws. A defendant’s poverty in no way
immunizes him from punishment.”); Westen, supra note 36, at 800. Incarceration of
Indigents, supra note 71, at 49 (“A problem may arise, of course, if an indigent cannot
pay his fine even on the installment method, since absolving him of the fine would mean
that an affluent defendant would sustain a greater aggregate penalty.”). But see Criminal
Law—Alabama Raises the Rates, supra note 49, at 739 (in Alabama, as part of plea
bargain for which they are given a fine, indigents waive their right to later claim
poverty).
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78

See Tate, 401 U.S. at 399-400 (court discusses various state solutions for collecting
fines, other than imprisonment). See also Incarceration of Indigents, supra note 71, at
49.
79
Bearden, 461 U.S. at 661–62.
80
Id. at 661–63
81
See id. at 661–62.
82
See Williams, 398 U.S. at 243 (“It bears emphasis that our holding does not deal with
a judgment of confinement for nonpayment of a fine in the familiar pattern of alternative
sentence of ‘$30 or 30 days.’”). See also Incarceration of Indigents, supra note 71, at 52.
83
See, e.g., Westen, supra note 36, at 786; Incarceration of Indigents, supra note 71, at
52-53.
84
See generally GILES PLAYFAIR & DERRICK SINGTON, CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND
CURE 101–04 (1965); Westen, supra note 36, at 810 (“There is evidence that the fine, if
properly imposed, is an effective deterrent.”).
85
This calculation is courtesy of my colleague from Economics and Finance, Dr. Peter
Brous, who compared the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for urban areas, non-seasonally
adjusted, for 1970 and 2005. Telephone Voice Mail from Peter Brous, Associate
Professor of Finance, Department of Economics, Albers School of Business and
Economics, Seattle University, to John Mitchell, Associate Professor of Law, Seattle
University School of Law (Aug. 8, 2005).
86
Implicit in Williams, 399 U.S. 235, was the assumption that imprisonment is worse
than a fine. See Incarceration of Indigents, supra note 71, at 47.
87
See, e.g., FEREBEE, supra note 3, at 9 (“Also the court policy of ‘pay the fine or serve
the jail sentence’ became a practice for criminal traffic fines. However, this resulted in
costing the city more money for the use of jail space than the amount of the original fine,
which the defendant failed to pay.”).
88
“[I]mprisonment in the Middle Ages was the least expensive of punishments because
prisons were self supporting. Jailkeepers earned their living by extorting money from
inmates and their relatives and friends.” Westen, supra note 36, at 784. Accord XI SIR
WILLIAM SHOLSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 567 (1938); MANN, supra note
50, at 87 (“debtors had to provide their own food, fuel, and clothing . . . or they did
without.”).
89
See BARTY-KING, supra note 42, at 4–5; Ford, supra note 33, at 40; Note, Present
Status, supra note 42, at 314 n.56.
90
As Johnson remarked of one debtor, “I can put him in [jail] any day, but that will not
pay the debt.” MANN, supra note 50, at 29. See also James, supra note 52, at 148
(“Incarceration for failure to pay debts ended because it largely failed to accomplish its
purpose: to force the repayment of the money owed”); Vogt, supra note 36, at 343
(“[I]mprisonment rarely had the effect of recovering property.”) Vogt, supra note 36, at
345 (“Imprisonment often failed to accomplish the desired outcome of repayment
because some debtors chose to remain in prison rather than be stripped of their assets”)
(footnote omitted); Ford, supra note 33, at 47 (“There is reason to think that creditors
actually collect very few legitimate claims by the use of imprisonment.”); Coleman,
supra note 37; Note, Equal Protection, supra note 60, at 943 (“It seems obvious that
depriving the accused of his liberty could not possibly have coerced payment of a fine he
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was incapable of paying, and would necessarily prevent the defendant from earning
money with which to pay the fine.”).
91
See Ford, supra note 33, at 40; Note, Present Status, supra note 42, at 314 n.56. See
also BARTY-KING, supra note 42, at 4-5; MANN, supra note 50, at 29; Arnoux, Civil
Imprisonment, supra note 52 (imprisonment for debt self-defeating); Robinson, supra
note 55, at 297 (“Attachment of the body in civil process has no justification as a method
of satisfying a fair claim, either in contract or in tort. To shut a man up in prison doesn’t
in any degree or to any extent pay the debt or damage.”); Westen, supra note 36, at 807
(“[T]he fundamental reason for abolishing imprisonment for debt is not to avoid
punishing the debtor but to avoid the imprisonment which makes it impossible for him,
as for the indigent criminal defendant, to earn money for the lack of which he is being
imprisoned.”); Vogt, supra note 36, at 343–44 (“[S]ince most debtors [in the colonies]
were insolvent, imprisonment only worsened their condition by piling up court and jail
cost in addition to the initial fine. [In fact, the system only] burdened the community
with the cost of caring for the debtor’s dependents.”).
92
See Ford, supra note 33, at 45–46; Westen, supra, note 36, at 794.
93
See Vogt, supra note 36, at 344; Note, Present Status, supra note 42, at 313–15.
94
“Imprisonment in such a case [when the defendant cannot pay a fine] is not imposed
to further any penal objective of the State. It is imposed to augment the State’s revenues
but obviously does not serve that purpose; the defendant cannot pay because he is
indigent and his imprisonment, rather than aiding collection of the revenue, saddles the
State with the cost of feeding and housing him for the period of his imprisonment.” Tate,
401 U.S. at 399.
See also Westen, supra note 36, at 788, 788 n.90 (“A state which imprisons a criminal
offender for a 20 dollar fine at the rate of one day in prison for each dollar of fine not
only loses the 20 dollars that probably could have been collected by other means [fn
omitted] but incurs the added expense for imprisoning the offender for 20 days.
Imprisonment is the most expensive of modern punishments.”) (footnotes omitted);
Carrie Wood, Connecting the Dots—Community Court System Offers Alternative
Services, Not Jail, REAL CHANGE, June 8-14, 2005, at 4 (In King Co. Washington, “Jail
time for minor criminals . . . costs about $92 a day”). See also MAXWELL, supra note 3,
at [13] (“The King County Correctional Facility charges the City of Seattle $121.58 per
booking and $63.54 per day in maintenance fees.”); id. at [37] (The total cost of jailing
offenders for suspended licenses in Seattle “is $1.2 million dollars per year.”).
95
See Westen, supra note 36, at 794 n.122, citing PLAYFAIR & SINGTON, supra note 84,
at 24–25, 27–28, 42, 105–06.
96
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (slavery abolished).
97
Equal Protection, supra note 60, at 946 (“[F]ines have become an important source of
government revenue.”).
98
WASH. INFRACTION R. CTS. LIMITED JURIS. 6.2.
99
Id. at 6.2(d).
100
See WASH. REV. CODE § 3.46.120 (2005); WASH. REV. CODE § 3.50.100 (2005).
101
Mr. Jeff Hall, the Executive Director of the Board for Judicial Administration in
Washington, pointed out that the Board was in the process of reviewing the complicated
formula of assessments and replacing it with a higher base penalty. E-mail from Jeff
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Hall, Executive Director, Board for Judicial Administration, to Kelly Kunsch, Reference
Librarian, Seattle University School of Law (June 1, 2005) (on file with authors).
102
E-mail from Randy Ball, Policy Coordinator, Executive Office of the Governor of the
State of Florida, Public Safety Unit, to Kelly Kunsch, Reference Librarian, Seattle
University School of Law (July 22, 2005) (on file with authors). The year 2004 is Fiscal
Year 2004-2005. Id.
103
CITY OF SEATTLE, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT 64 (Dec. 31, 2004).
104
SCOTT D. DWYER & MARY B. DWYER, 2005 WASHINGTON STATE YEARBOOK: THE
EVERGREEN STATE GOVERNMENT DIRECTORY 141 (2005).
105
See GRANT COUNTY, COMBINED STATEMENT OF REVENUES, EXPENDITURES AND
CHANGES IN FUND BALANCE, ALL GOVERNMENT FUND TYPES FOR THE YEAR ENDED
DECEMBER 31, 2000,” available at
http://www.co.grant.wa.us/auditor/Accounting/AnnualReport/annual.htm.
106
Moore, 91 P.3d 875. “Court revenues decreased over the past two years due to the
Supreme Court ruling on driving with suspended license cases.” See, e.g., CITY OF LAKE
FOREST PARK, SUSTAINABLE BUDGET POLICY PROCESS 17, available at
http://www.cityoflfp.com/city/budget/default.html. The graphic on the page shows a
reduction from about $340,000 in 2003 to below $310,000 for 2004. Id.
107
WASH. REV. CODE § 46.63.110.
108

For the American male (and men elsewhere), infatuation with the automobile
is loaded with sexual freight. Worship of the car begins in childhood and
reaches the auto-erotic phase at the onset of puberty, when cars, like girls, are
still worshipped from afar. The older adolescent readies himself for his
driver’s license much as he prepares himself to lose his virginity, and so it
goes until he locks himself into a union that makes no provision for divorce.
Recurring bouts of vapor lock are not sufficient grounds for ending the
marriage, nor will an epidemic of transmission problems justify an annulment.
In a world created by the automobile, the automobile rules.
CHRISTOPHER FINCH, HIGHWAY TO HEAVEN 12 (1992). See also FLINK, AUTOMOBILE
AGE, supra note 23, at 160-62.
109
“At a practical level, the appeal of the automobile is easily described. Unlike the
train, or the trolley car, or the bus, it goes where and when you want, stops where and
when you want. Certainly this appeals to every American’s sense of God-given
independence . . .” FINCH, supra note 108, at 11.
110
Government certification of competent driving was well established in Europe by the
turn of the twentieth century. JAMES J. FLINK, AMERICA ADOPTS THE AUTOMOBILE
1895–1919, at 174 (1970) [hereinafter FLINK, AMERICA ADOPTS]. However, before
1901 U.S. states had very little to do with motor vehicles. Carl Watner, Driver’s
Licenses and Vehicle Registration in Historical Perspective, in NATIONAL
IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS 101 (Carl Watner & Wendy McElroy eds., 2004). Rather,
whatever regulation existed was imposed by the cities. For example, Chicago had a
licensing law in 1898 (later declared unconstitutional) and in 1899 required the
examination and licensing of all drivers. Id. at 102. The real impetus for licensing,
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however, came from “automotive interests” in the form of the American Automobile
Association and the Automobile Club of America. FLINK, AMERICA ADOPTS, supra, at
175; Watner, supra, at 104. Interestingly, safety concerns did not appear to be a central
factor in the initial movement for licensing.
One thing is clear from historical record: While the justification for government
licensing of automobile operators was sometimes a safety issue, in a majority of the
states, driver competency examinations were not imposed until years after the initial
licensing regulations were adopted. Watner, supra, at 103. Thus, among twelve East
Coast states between January 1, 1909 and October 4, 1909, 89,495 driver’s licenses were
issued, and only twelve people were rejected for incompetence (ten in Vermont). FLINK,
AMERICA ADOPTS, supra, at 178. In fact, even in the 1930s and 1940s there were states
where no examination was required for a driver’s license; one merely paid a fee. Watner,
supra, at 104–05.
111
NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 2003, at Ch. 4 Table 34 (2003), available at
http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd-30/NCSA/ITSFAnn/2003HTML/cov2.htm.
112
Id.
113
Id. at Summary (statistics include reported and unreported crashes for year 2000).
114
Washington State revokes licenses of “Habitual Offenders” (i.e., three major
violations or twenty moving violations within a five year period, see WASH. REV. CODE
§ 46.65.020 (2005)). WASH. REV. CODE § 46.20.291(3) (2005). Other states have
similar laws; Florida, for example, suspends licenses based upon a point system. See
SCOPATZ ET AL., supra note 3, at 32.
115
It is well-established in our society that driving is considered a “privilege”, and not a
“right.” See Watner, supra note 110, at 109.
[T]he general legal consensus is that driving is a privilege, not a right. How
we reached that point remains to be explained, but the actions of the American
Bar Association’s National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws should not be overlooked. Started in 1889, as part of an effort to
standardize state laws, the Commissioners developed a Uniform Motor
Vehicle Operation and Chauffeur’s License Act in 1926. This was at a time
when driving was still recognized as a common law right in at least the eight
states, which issued no licenses (either operator or chauffeur) at all. Thus the
ABA, under its self-appointed mandate to produce uniformity [of laws] among
the states, labored to license every driver in America.
Id. at 109–10. There are those, however, who contest this proposition that driving is a
privilege. They maintain that access to the public roadways is a fundamental right
(whether by foot, horse, cart, or car), and that while the state may set driving laws (e.g.,
speeding) and hold people civilly accountable for their accidents, it may not require
licensing of non-commercial driving. See, e.g., Jack McLamb, Driving A Right, Not a
Privilege, AID AND ABET NEWSLETTER, Feb. 3, 2003; see also Jack McLamb, Driver
Licensing vs. The Right to Travel, http://www.uslawbooks.com/travel/travel.htm (last
visited Oct. 31, 2005) [hereinafter McLamb, Driver Licensing]. An interesting variant
asserts the rights of bicyclists vis-à-vis motorists. See Steven G. Goodridge, The Right to
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Travel by Human Power,
http://www.bicyclinglife.com/EffectiveAdvocacy/TheRightToTravel.htm (last visited
Oct. 31, 2005).
116
Similarly, while a driver’s license provides good identification when required in some
roadway encounter, it would seem no better than, for example, a passport (though it may
be that some police computer systems are keyed to driver’s license numbers, and the
passport would offer a less efficient entry into their databases).
117
See SINGER & LAFOND, supra note 6, at 25 (“The alternative major explanation for
punishment is retribution. Retribution argues that those who do wrong (i.e., criminal)
acts deserve punishment, and that it should be imposed on them even if it serves no
utilitarian purpose.”); DRESSLER, supra note 6, at 11 (“Retributivists believe that
punishment is justified when it is deserved. It is deserved when the wrongdoer freely
chooses to violate society’s rules.”).
118
“General deterrence” theory “posits that punishment of a criminal . . . reduces future
crime . . . [because] other persons, contemplating committing crimes and learning of the
threatened punishment, will decide not to do so.” SINGER & LA FOND, supra note 6, at
19; see also DRESSLER, supra note 6, at 10.
119
See McLamb, Driver Licensing, supra note 115, at § Regulation, Question One
(stating that a driver’s license is a proxy for competence).
120
One could argue that those ticketed for moving violations (e.g., running a stop sign)
who fail to accept the punishment (i.e., fine) are failing to acknowledge responsibility for
their unsafe driving and therefore likely to continue driving unsafely. The problem with
this argument is its major factual premise. Likely over 90% of those failing to pay traffic
tickets do so not out of some sense of indifference to their actions; they want to pay their
tickets—they do not pay because they do not have the money. See Interview with Mary
Wolney, supra note 5; Interview with LaVerne Jones, supra note 19.
121
See MAXWELL, supra note 3, at [10-11]; SCOPATZ ET AL., supra note 3, at 16-17;
David J. DeYoung et al., Estimating the Exposure and Fatal Crash Rates of
Suspended/Revoked and Unlicensed Drivers in California, 29 ACCID. ANAL. AND
PREVENTION 17 (1997).
122
See SCOPATZ ET AL., supra note 3, at 7.
123
Id.
124
See DeYoung et al., supra note 121, at 21, Table 1. See also SCOPATZ ET AL., supra
note 3, at 55, Table A1 (showing national statistics).
125
See DeYoung et al., supra note 121, at 17 (abstract), 21. See also SCOPATZ ET AL.,
supra note 3, at 8, 16–17. In general, the study showed that in California
“suspended/revoked [hereinafter S/R] and unlicensed drivers are over represented in fatal
crashes by about a factor of 2-5, relative to their presence on the road.” De Young et al.,
supra note 121, at 19.
126
See SCOPATZ ET AL., supra note 3, at 9, 20.
127
For example, in 2003, alcohol was involved in 40% of fatal traffic accidents.
NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 111, at Ch.2 Table
34 (2003), available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd30/NCSA/ITSFAnn/2003HTMLTSF/tbl34.htm.
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128

For example, “Driving again while intoxicated after being convicted of DUI is fairly
common if the person suffers from alcoholism. For the social drinker, the experience of
the criminal law is so bad that the likely will never drive after drinking again. But for
those with the disease, relapse is a normal part of treatment . . . [and] they probably will
drive again after drinking because part of the disease is loss of control. . . . My hunch is
that [even after a DUI conviction] 30-25% will drive while intoxicated.” Telephone
Interview with Ken Urich, Chemical Dependency Professional/Clinical Social Worker at
Assessment and Treatment Associates, Bellevue, Washington, in Seattle, Wash. (Aug.
11, 2005).
129
See SCOPATZ ET AL., supra note 3, at 7.
130
Id. at 17.
131
Id. at 65. “[T]hese drivers [involved in fatal crashes across the country] tend to be
young, male, more likely to have consumed alcohol before driving, more likely to have
been driving all night, been recently convicted of DWI, and to have three or more
suspensions or revocations.” MAXWELL, supra note 3, at [11]. See also SCOPATZ ET
AL., supra note 3, at 67-68 (high percentage of S/R in fatal crashes have previous DUI
convictions).
132
SCOPATZ ET AL., supra note 3, at 20.
133
See, e.g., MAXWELL, supra note 3, at [9] (“Thirty year’s worth of traffic safety
research has shown a correlation between license status and collisions, since drivers with
suspended or revoked (S/R) licenses are at a greater risk for involvement in fatal traffic
accidents.”).
134
DeYoung et al., supra note 121, at 18.
135
Id. at 21. See also SCOPATZ ET AL., supra note 3, at 8 (“Their [DeYoung’s group]
methodology has limitations, however, most notably the need to establish the identity of
the driver at fault in a fatal crash.”). But cf. MAXWELL, supra note 3, at [11]. In 2000,
Seattle City Attorney, Mark Sidren, testified at a sentencing guidelines hearing that in
reviewing 427 traffic collisions in which “at least one driver had S/R status . . . S/R
drivers were at fault 75% of the time, and that 88% of those drivers were third-degree
DWLS defendants.” Id. at [11]. Sidren did not state how many of these 427 accidents
involved both drivers with S/R status. See id.
Also, as the California study itself identified, there could be a “negative halo” effect,
with police attributing fault to one of the driver’s because of their S/R status when,
without the S/R, neither driver would have been found at fault and the accident would not
have been included in the study. DeYoung et al., supra note 121, at 20.
Finally, in a high proportion of fatality accidents involving S/R drivers, the S/R
drivers were riding motorcycles. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY
ADMINISTRATION, supra note 111, at Motorcycle.
136
See SCOPATZ ET AL., supra note 3, at 40, 45.
137
See supra note 6.
138
See DRESSLER, supra note 6, at 10. “[T]hose who commit criminal acts have rejected
important social norms have thereby demonstrated their willingness to continue to do so
in the future. Thus, for the good of those who abide by the law, these offenders must be
prevented (incapacitated) from re-offending.” SINGER & LA FOND, supra note 6, at 22.
Some believe that during this incapacitation, incarceration should fill the function of

VOLUME 4 • ISSUE 1 • 2006

485

486 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

rehabilitation. Id. at 23–25. “This theory holds that offenders can be ‘changed’ into
‘non-offenders’ if given proper ‘treatment.’” Id. at 23.
139
But, what if a parent must break into a pharmacy late at night to obtain medication of
their very sick child, and if the parent does not burgle the pharmacy, the child will most
likely die? For that, our society provides the “defense of necessity”:
“necessity. 1. A justification defense for a person who acts in an emergency
that he or she did not create and who commits a harm that is less severe than
the harm that would have occurred but for the person’s actions. For example, a
mountain climber lost in a blizzard can assert necessity as a defense to theft of
food and blankets from another’s cabin.—Also, termed choice of evils; duress
of circumstances; lesser-evils defense. 2. A privilege that may relieve a person
from liability for trespass or conversion if that person, having no alternative,
harms another’s property in an effort to protect life or health.”
A HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW TERMS 460-61 (Bryan A. Garner, ed. 2000).
In America, we have made the choice to rely on the private automobile for urban mass
transportation:

140

Urban populations may rely upon systems of mass transit, as in Moscow,
Russia, or on the automobile, as in most urban areas in the United States. In
Europe, governments heavily subsidize mass transit and make it expensive to
drive automobiles. In the United States, a combination of public subsidies for
highways and disinvestment in mass transit has resulted in a heavy reliance on
the automobile. In most metropolitan areas, less than 10% of commuters use
public transportation, and in most Sunbelt cities, the proportion is 5 percent or
less.
Dennis R. Judd, Cities and the Environment, in HANDBOOK ON RESEARCH ON URBAN
POLITICS AND POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 400 (Ronald K. Vogel ed.,1997) (citations
omitted).
Perhaps the larger public policy question is the role of the Automobile in
American life. Legislative bodies have made and continue to make laws from
the perspective that driving is privilege and not a right. There is not doubt that
driving and owning a vehicle have specific legal and financial responsibilities
attached thereto. However, the reality is that we are a society that relies
heavily on our mobility, especially for employment and to access services for
ourselves and our families. Urban areas, with high-density population centers,
are generally served by rapid transit, but others, like Los Angeles or Dallas,
are only just beginning to invest in public transit infrastructure. Even cities
with good rapid transit systems cannot provide the level of service that many
citizens must have to meet their employment and family needs. Residents in
our rural areas are truly dependent on their vehicles and often have few options
available for paying fines. Standardizing and expanding compliance options
available throughout Washington would benefit many of our citizens.
MAXWELL, supra note 3, at [49-50].
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See generally FINCH, supra note 108; FLINK, AMERICA ADOPTS, supra note 110;
FLINK, AUTOMOBILE AGE, supra note 23; HOLTZ KAY, supra note 23.
142
See FLINK, AMERICA ADOPTS, supra note 110, at 50–51.
143
Id.
144
Id. at 58.
145
Id.
146
See Megan Shaw and Rick Prelinger, Manifest Congestion: Freeway Landscapes and
Timescapes, BAD SUBJECTS, Oct., 1998, available at http://www.eserver.org/bs/40/shawprelinger.html-73k.
147
See FLINK, AMERICA ADOPTS, supra note 110, at 58.
148
See id. at 2. With the automobile industry also comes mass production, multidivision
corporations, modern management techniques, and consumer credit. Id.
149
See FLINK, AUTOMOBILE AGE, supra note 23, at 3.
150
For a discussion on the creation of our highway and road system, see HOLTZ KAY,
supra note 23, at 224-233. See also FLINK, AUTOMOBILE AGE, supra note 23, at 368–
376.
151
See JAMES J. FLINK, CAR CULTURE 178 (1978) [hereinafter FLINK, CAR CULTURE].
152
Norman Rockwell (1894–1978) was an illustrator whose scenes of American life
reflected the innocent and ideal aspects of our culture. E.g., NEW YORK PUBLIC
LIBRARY DESK REFERENCE 224 (4th ed. 2002).
153
See FLINK, CAR CULTURE, supra note 151, at 178–79. See also FINCH, supra
note 108, at 343:

After the war [WWII], wagons became even more popular, while conventional
sedans began to offer more and more trunk space. Such space was still useful
on long journeys, but it found regular employment in trips to the market, the
hardware store and the shopping center. When cars became smaller,
manufacturers made certain that they continued to offer plenty of storage
space, knowing that this had become an everyday requirement. Even the
smallest of the subcompacts was offered in a station-wagon format, and a
novel solution to increasing carrying volume was found in the three-door or
hatchback formula, which combined the looks of a sedan with some of the
features of a wagon. All these developments were designed largely to enhance
the automobile as a shopping tool.
In this way, the shopping environment has shaped the car, and reciprocally
the car has shaped the retail environment. The original strips evolved into
mercantile eco-systems in which the space allocated to parking dictated lowdensity development. The mall concept permitted the return to a city-style,
high-density shopping experience, but it too was predicated on the automobile
and hence demanded either huge lots or elaborate parking structures. Such
parking structures are often handsome, in a functional way, and some are
successfully integrated with the architecture of the actual shopping precinct.
Often, though, the mall is sited to take advantage of low land values and hence
surrounds itself with an apron of raw parking space.
154

See FLINK, CAR CULTURE, supra note 151, at 164.
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155

See, e.g., STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, UNDAUNTED COURAGE: MERIWETHER LEWIS,
THOMAS JEFFERSON, AND THE OPENING OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1996).
156
While we are not making a constitutional claim, plainly the construct of the “freedom
of locomotion” pulls a variety of constitutional threads which merit mention. “The idea
of a right of locomotion is neither novel nor radical. Americans have enjoyed the
freedom to walk the streets and move about the country free from unreasonable
government intrusion for many years.” Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right to
Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1260
(1990).
Initially considered a “natural right” protected by the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the United States Constitution see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 555-56 (2d ed. 1988), the right to locomotion found a home in
other portions of the Constitution following the death knell of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872) (case
eviscerated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by
holding that it only applied to rights of “national citizenship”). See also TRIBE, supra.
Thus, the right to interstate travel found support in both the very structure of a
constitution creating a federal republic, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629
(1969) (one year residency requirement for welfare violates implicit guarantee in
constitution that “all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our
land”), and in the Equal Protection clause, see Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 339–40
(1972) (“In Shapiro, we explicitly stated that the compelling state interest test would be
triggered by ‘any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of [the right to
travel] . . . ’”). The right to intrastate locomotion has found constitutional support under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Gordon Hill, The Use of PreExisting Exclusionary Zones as Probationary Conditions for Prostitution Offenses: A
Call for the Sincere Application of Heightened Scrutiny, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 173,
185 (2004), and, for some, under attributes of the Fourth Amendment, see Maclin, supra,
at 1261.
157
See supra notes 140–41.
158
See MAXWELL, supra note 3, at [37]. “[T]ransportation and the status of individual
driver’s licenses [are] two potential barriers to employment or advancement to higher
paying jobs.” Id. at [7]. See also HOTLZ KAY, supra note 23, at 39:
Red Hook’s isolation has given it a perverse ‘end-of-Western-civilization’ chic
to the artists and activists attracted to its warehouses. Nonetheless, working
life for the old residents is an oppressive circle. The highways that destroyed
the neighborhood caused its emptying. The emptying produced low density,
which undercut public transportation and kept income down. The low-income
inhabitants lack money to buy a car and hence find work, and, thus, the
neighborhood deteriorates further. It is a cycle. A few years ago, Kassinitz
conducted a survey at the South Brooklyn Local Development Corporation, an
employment agency interviewing out-of-work community members applying
for jobs. Three hundred people came looking for work, but only 9 percent of
the adults had driver’s licenses. ‘Here’s a place that hires a lot of truck drivers
and this agency couldn’t place them.’
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See Interview with Mary Wolney, supra note 5.
See supra note 115.
161
Again, such futility has accompanied every attempt to coerce revenue from the poor
throughout history. See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
162
MAXWELL, supra note 3, at [19-20] (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
163
“A valid driver’s license is frequently one of the most important assets that an
unemployed individual has.” Id. at [39]. A study of the impact of driver’s license
revocation in Wisconsin thus found:
160

As in many parts of the country, many of Milwaukee’s jobs have left or are
leaving the downtown core area and moving to the suburbs and other outlying
areas, some of which have limited public transportation service. Combined,
job location, bus schedules, and child care requirements make having a car and
a valid driver’s license critical to job retention. Suspended [driver’s] license
holders who need their jobs to pay off their fines may find it difficult to retain
those jobs, especially if they require a valid driver’s license.
Research from the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee indicates that the
two greatest barriers to the employment or better employment are
transportation and childcare. They are, of course, often linked: transportation
plays an essential role in delivering children to affordable childcare centers
and then taking the parents to the workplace. This is especially critical for
single parents (mostly female), who are the special focus of many programs
designed to help people make a transition from welfare to work.
Id. at [39-41].
“Work provides a person in this culture with an identity. ‘I’m a nurse’ has a cultural
moral overlay that I can see myself as ‘worthy’ (as opposed to being a sponger) in that
I’m contributing to society, provides the feeling of being ‘productive’ so valued in our
culture, and (especially for women) economic independence.” Telephone Interview with
Dr. Ruth White, Program Director of Social Services, Seattle University, in Seattle,
Wash. (Sept. 8, 2005).
165
Vehicle impoundment, one proposed “solution” to keeping S/R drivers off the road,
has only compounded the misery of drivers suspended for nonpayment of fines.
Impoundment of cars driven by those whose licenses were revoked for DUI, or other
safety-related causes is an effective way to keep these drivers off the road. See SCOPATZ
ET AL., supra note 3, at 19-21. See also MAXWELL, supra note 3, at [6], [19-25]. In the
Seattle impound program, however, 85% of the cars impounded were for drivers whose
license had been suspended for nonpayment of fines. See id. at 27]. Further, the
impoundments had a strong racial bias. “According to the data collected in 1999, more
than 40% of the approximately 5,000 cars impounded for DWLS violations were driven
or owned by African-Americans, who overall comprise 11% of the Seattle population . . .
.” Id. at [28]. We think that the consequences of taking the vehicle, which is frequently
the single most valuable asset of a poor or low-income person, from someone who cannot
even afford to pay their fines are obvious. Impoundment can also lead to ripples of
incredible injustice, as shown by the following story related to me by Mary Wolney. See
Interview with Mary Wolney, supra note 5:
164
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While in the hospital for kidney problems, the client’s friend borrowed his car without
his knowledge. The friend, who had his driver’s license suspended for nonpayment of
fines was stopped by the police, and when his DWLS3 status was discovered the car was
impounded. (The impound ordinance let police impound any car driven by a suspended
driver, regardless of the registered owner.) By the time the client got out of the hospital,
five days of storage charges (at $30 per day) had been added to the several hundred
dollars of impound charges. When he told the towing company that he could not pay,
and they should just sell his car for what he owed, he was told that statutory requirements
for auction of the vehicle by a towing company involved a process that would take thirty
days. At the end of the thirty days, a month’s storage costs had pushed his tab well over
$1,000. After his car was auctioned for $200, the towing company assigned the balance
to a collection agency.
166
Some have suggested that fines be “proportioned” by income, with fines reflecting
current bail reports or public defender eligibility reports. See, e.g., CLIVE HAMILTON,
THE AUSTL. INSTITUTE, MAKING FINES FAIRER (2004); Australia Should Change System
of Traffic Fines: Think Tank, AUSTL. ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSFEED, Jan. 16, 2005
(Domestic News); Westen, supra note 36, at 812. In theory, lower fines for the poor
would make it more likely that they could pay the fine and avoid a license suspension.
167
See FEREBEE, supra note 3, at 5, 30-31. See also Westen, supra note 36, at 816. In
collecting payments, some courts are trying to incorporate the use of credit cards and
even the internet. FEREBEE, supra note 3, at 5, 8, 43
168
See Tate, 401 U.S. at 400 n.5.
169
Westen, supra note 36, at 819-20.
170
See MAXWELL, supra note 3, at [30] (there are “people who simply forgot about the
court appearance or fine and had their [driver’s] licenses suspended because of honest or
careless oversight”).
171
See Interview with LaVerne Jones, supra note 19 (clients are always moving around;
those who came from out of state will go back for periods of time without notifying the
agency; they also may not have regular phone service).
172
See FEREBEE, supra note 3, at 30.
173
See Boruchowitz, Right to Counsel, supra note 17, at 29; MAXWELL, supra note 3, at
[32]; Interview with Mary Wolney, supra note 5.
174
See MAXWELL, supra note 3, at [37-39]. See also Interview with LaVerne Jones,
supra note 19. In a study, those in the CAMP program had an eleven-fold decrease in
DWLS3o convictions, compared to a three-fold decrease in the control group, and thirtynine times the collection rate than the control group. MAXWELL, supra note 3, at [4246].
175
See Interview with LaVerne Jones, supra note 19.
176
See Interview with Mary Wolney, supra note 5.
177
Id.. While the new Washington statute generally mandates payment plans similar to
these court programs, see supra note 14, the plan also contains similar obstacles for the
low-income or poor defendant. Failure to make a payment results in a driver’s license
suspension (absent a court finding of “good cause,” which as a practical matter
presupposes the defendant receiving notice of the hearing and appearing). WASH. REV.
CODE § 46.63.110(6)(a). Also, while administrative costs for the court payment program
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are low ($10/infraction or $25 for the payment plan, whichever is less), id. §
46.63.110(6)(c), the rule permits the court to “contract[ ] with outside entities” to
administer the payment plan, id. § 46.63.110(6)(d). That means collection agencies and
the costs and fees associated with that private enterprise already discussed.
178
Telephone Interview with John Boquist, Vice President, Alliance One Collection
Agency, in Seattle, Wash. (Aug. 17, 2005).
179
See WASH. REV. CODE § 46.63.110.
180
Interview with LaVerne Jones, supra note 19.
181
Telephone Interview with Eileen Kato, Judge, Seattle District Court, in Seattle, Wash.
(Sept. 4, 2005).
182
See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text. The new Washington statute, see
supra note 11, provides that community service can substitute for cash payment of fines
as part of an installment plan. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.63.110(6)(e).
183
See supra note 171.
184
See FEREBEE, supra note 3, at 34-35. See also supra note 12.
185
See FEREBEE, supra note 3, at 59.
186
See supra note 171.
187
In the State of Washington, these additional fees can be up to 50% of the outstanding
fines. See supra note 12.
188
See Interview with Mary Wolney, supra note 5; see also Interview with John Boquist,
supra note 178.
189
See Interview with Mary Wolney, supra note 5. However, some courts have
agreements with the collection agency so that the repayment plan only includes the traffic
fine and fees. Id.
190
See Interview with LaVerne Jones, supra note 19.
191
In MAXWELL, supra note 3, at [30], the Report noted three categories of DWLS3o
defendants. The first is “[t]he can nots: individuals who are disorganized in many
aspects of their lives, and who consider a ticket or a court date as one more
overwhelming event.” The Report went on to state:
While no statistics are available regarding the composition of suspended
drivers, a large amount of continually evolving anecdotal evidence states that
most fall into the first category. “Can nots” are people who are easily
overwhelmed by what others consider basic tasks. For them, the idea of
avoiding payments and court appearances results in harsher penalties is
difficult to comprehend or accept. They view courts and bureaucracies in
general as formidable obstacles that cannot be dealt with easily or effectively.
As a result, many members of this group are unable to find or hold jobs, or to
perform such simple tasks as obtaining auto insurance.
Id. at [31].
192
LAWRENCE SHULMAN, THE SKILLS OF HELPING INDIVIDUALS, FAMILIES, GROUPS,
AND COMMUNITIES 714 (6th ed. 1999).
As is often the case, the very institutions set up to solve problems became so
complex themselves that new problems were generated. Social, medical, and
educational systems can be difficult to negotiate even for individuals who are
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well equipped to deal with them, let alone those with limited education and
resources. The services established for people are often so complex that it is
difficult for individuals to make use of them. . . . A third factor contributing to
breakdowns in the individual-system relationship is the size of a bureaucracy.
For example, finding the right department in a large government agency can
be a frustrating, even overwhelming, task.
Id.
193

Id.
William J. Reid & Elizabeth Misener, Adult Change, in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
WORK DIRECT PRACTICE 246 (Paula Allen-Meares & Charles Garvin eds., 2000).
195
Id. (citations omitted).
196
See, e.g., Peter De Jong & Scott D. Miller, How to Interview for Client Strengths, 40
SOCIAL WORK 729 (1995).
197
Telephone interview with Mary Kay Brennan, Clinical Assistant Professor and Field
Director for Social Work, Seattle University, in Seattle, Wash. (Aug. 29, 2005). See also
Céline Mercier & Guylaine Racine, Case Management with Homeless Women: A
Descriptive Study, 31 COMMUN. MENTAL HEALTH J. 25, 25-27 (1995); Nancy Wolff et
al., Cost Effectiveness Evaluation of Three Approaches to Case Management for
Homeless Mentally Ill Clients, 154 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 341 (1997).
198
FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE: A GRADUATE TEXT 179-80 (Mark A.
Mattaini et al. eds., 3d ed. 2002).
199
Beulah R. Compton & Burt Galaway, Interview Methods to Mobilize Client Power, in
SOCIAL WORK PROCESSES 343-44 (Brooks/Cole Publ’g Co., 6th ed. 1999) (citations
omitted).
200
See Boruchowitz, Right to Counsel, supra note 17, at 27 (“Another alternative would
be to decriminalize some minor offenses, including DWLS3 for people whose driver’s
licenses are suspended only for failing to pay tickets.”). In fact, at a King County
Regional Justice Summit in 2003, decriminalization was on the agenda. Id.
201
An issue arises regarding the common failure of low-income and poor drivers who fail
to have insurance. While not the focus of this article, we recognize that it is a significant
issue in its own right, both because of the magnitude of the fines and because some may
contend that you should not drive without insurance, and you should be denied a license
if you persist in driving without insurance (as opposed to losing your license just for not
paying a fine).
202
See Interview with Mary Wolney, supra note 5.
203
See Interview with Mary Wolney, supra note 5. See also Interview with LaVerne
Jones, supra note 19. Cf. MAXWELL, supra note 3, at [30-31] (court found suspended
drivers generally fit in one of three categories: “The Can Nots,” “The Did Nots,” and
“The Will Nots”—‘Scofflaws who intentionally avoid paying fines or appearing in
court”). The majority of those suspended for nonpayment fell into the first category. Id.
at [31].
204
If we do not revoke driver’s licenses when people fail to pay tickets, questions arise of
what to do about the unpaid fines at the point the person goes to the DOL to renew their
driver’s license. We would propose that they go to a specially designated DOL center
where a specialist helps them work out a payment plan (backed by reasonable
194
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enforcement mechanisms). Alternatively, violators could fill out an affidavit of
indigency, reacquire their driver’s license, and the state could seek enforcement of fines
through other enforcement methods discussed.
205
One superficial impediment to not revoking driver’s licenses for nonpayment is the
Non-Resident Violation Compact. WASH. REV. Code § 46.23.010 (Art. IV(a)) ( 2005).
In the past, an out-of-state driver stopped for a traffic violation would be hurried in front
of a court or thrown in jail because, otherwise, the jurisdiction knew that the driver would
drive back home and they would never get payment of the fine. The Compact avoids this
vacationer’s nightmare by agreeing that if our resident gets an out-of-state ticket,
payment on that ticket will be enforced by the home state. The problem is that under the
Compact the remedy for nonpayment of your out-of-state ticket is suspension of your
driver’s license by your home state. Why this is the sole remedy, instead of the home
state agreeing to indemnify the foreign state and then using any method they choose to
get the ticket paid, seems a mystery. Yet, in any event, being a signatory on the Compact
would, at most, mean that those who fail to pay out-of-state tickets, (only a small
percentage of those revoked for nonpayment), will have their driver’s licenses suspended.
See Interview with Mary Wolney, supra note 5. Given that driving an automobile is not
even considered a “right,” (see supra note 115) minimum scrutiny equal protection
analysis will apply, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307
(1993), and the distinction between revoking the driver’s licenses of those whose tickets
are out of state, and not those who are in state, will pass constitutional muster because
under a rational basis analysis, there is a “strong presumption of validity,” the challenger
must “negative every conceivable basis which might support it,” and the supporting
rational may rely entirely on “rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical
data.” Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 314-15.
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